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Computer Application To Law - International Aviation
Liability Analysis - Warsaw, Hague, Montreal Flight
I. INTRODUCTION
A legal analysis suitable for computer application is the determination
of the applicability of the Warsaw Convention,' the Hague Protocol,
and the Montreal Agreement' to a series of contracts for carriage by air.
This comment presents a program (see tables 1, 1-A, 1-B, 1-C) capable of
performing such an analysis. The thrust of this article is purely academic,
but possible commercial applications of a program such as the one presented
herein include use of the program in connection with an airline reservation
system. The air carrier would be able to give actual notice to the pas-
senger of the very high probability of limitations of liability, rather than
the generalized notice that is present on virtually all major airline tickets
today, even on obviously domestic flight tickets. Other possible commer-
cial applications include use by an insurance company to advise potential
insurance buyers at an airport of the relation of international conventions
limiting liability to their flights. Finally, if a nation decided to impose
a compulsory insurance program for international flights, a program such
as the one now presented could indicate precisely which passengers should
pay added insurance costs; the indication could be made to the ticket
reservationist at the time of purchase of the contract.
II. PROGRAm LOGIC
A. Subroutines
1. Subroutine "Flight" (See Table 1-A.)
The crux of the program logic is found in the flight subroutine which
analyzes whether the criteria for an international flight under Warsaw
and Hague are met. The logic is common to both Warsaw and Hague
'Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air, 29 Oct. 1934, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (text in CivrL AERONAUTICS BOARD, AERONAUTICAL
STATUTES AND RELATED MATERIALS [hereinafter cited AERONAUTICAL STATUTES] 289 (1967).)
'Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Inter-
national Carriage by Air (signed at Warsaw, Poland, 12 Oct. 1929) (text in AERONAUTICAL
STATUTES, supra note 1, at 283).
'Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Pro-
tocol, CAB Agreement 18990, approved by CAB Order No. E-23680, 13 May 1966 (text in AERO-
NAUTICAL STATUTES, supra note 1, at 324).
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solutions. Accordingly, the flight subroutine is reused in order that both
tests may be made according to their common logic.
Succinctly, a flight contract is Warsaw carriage if and only if
(1) The point of arrival and the point of departure are in High Con-
tracting Parties to the Convention,
AND (2) Either:
(a) The point of arrival is not in the same High Contracting Party as
the point of departure,
or
(b) if the point of arrival is in the same High Contracting Party as
the point of departure, there is an intermediate agreed stopping point in a
different power (not necessarily a High Contracting Party) from the point
of arrival or destination.4
As noted above, the same logic applies to Hague, with Hague parties
substituted for Warsaw parties as High Contracting Parties.
Subroutine Flight is used to test whether the criteria set forth above
have been satisfied.
2. Subroutine "Except" (See Table 1-B.)
A significant problem is the failure of the United States to recognize the
High Contracting Party status of the People's Republic of China, North
Korea, and East Germany.' Accordingly, an exception subroutine is utilized
to identify whether any of the agreed stopping places in a flight is one of
these nations. People's China is designated RDCHIN; North Korea is
designated RDKORE. It is also used to make it possible to rerun the
program after the initial analysis, treating these nations as non-High
Contracting Parties for the second analysis. A defect in the present pro-
gram is that a test for East Germany was not included, although the print
instructions indicate that one is present. Although a test for East Germany
could be readily included, it is not. The tests for Mainland China and
North Korea, however, have been included.
3. Subroutine "Mont" (See Table 1-C.)
If one of the agreed stopping places or the point of arrival or the point
of departure is in the United States, the flight is a Montreal flight con-
tract, and the limitation of liability is $75,000 instead of $16,580 for
Hague contracts and $8,290 for Warsaw contracts! Hence, a Montreal
subroutine has been included to identify flights in which the U.S.A. is
included.
A test to discover whether the United Kingdom is included in the flight
contract is also present in the Montreal subroutine, although the United
Kingdom is not at all involved directly in Montreal flight. The United
Kingdom test is entirely unrelated, but is present to show that informa-
tional messages for given countries can be included in a program. The
United Kingdom message indicates the nation's High Contracting Party
status is unrelated to its colonies, protectorates, etc.
4 AERONAUTICAL STATUTES, supra note 1, at 284,285.
'AERONAUTICAL STATUTES, supra note 1, at 319-23.
6AERONAUTICAL STATUTES, supra note 1, at 324.
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B. Integration Of Subroutines Into Main Program Logic
(See Table 1.)
The main program first calls Subroutine Flight to test if the carriage is
Hague carriage. Next, it recalls the same subroutine to analyze whether
Warsaw flight criteria have been satisfied. Subsequently, the main program
calls Subroutine Mont to test whether the flight is covered by the Mon-
treal Agreement and whether the United States and/or the United King-
dom are included in the flight contract.
According to whether a flight satisfies the conditions for Hague, War-
saw, and Montreal, an appropriate message is printed noting the applica-
tion of the appropriate conventions and agreements and the limitations of
liability. If the flight contract is not covered by any of the above, a mes-
sage is printed to that effect, but also warning the passenger that a local
limitation of liability might apply since the flight is not covered by inter-
national agreement. If the United States or the United Kingdom was dis-
covered by the Subroutine Mont, information messages are printed.
Finally, Subroutine Except is called to test for the presence of People's
China and North Korea. (As noted above, the test for East Germany was
omitted.) If either of the two specified "RD" nations are encountered, the
subroutine changes these parties to non-High Contracting Parties and the
program is rerun for a second time after the original analysis, treating them
in the second run as High Contracting Parties. Appropriate messages are




The names of the Hague and Warsaw parties are chosen from lists in
AERONAUTICAL STATUTES AND RELATED MATERIALS by the CAB (1967)
at 319-323. It is important to note that an important assumption has been
made that all Hague parties either are formal Warsaw parties or are implied
members through their membership in Hague. Accordingly, Hague coun-
tries not mentioned in the lists of Warsaw countries have been included
for purposes of this data input in the Warsaw matrix. The printout of
this input of High Contracting Parties is shown in tables 2-A and 2-B.
All input, including that of the program itself, was done on punched
cards.
Sample flight contracts are fed into the computer for processing accord-
ing to the program. Abbreviations used for countries that are not Hague
or Warsaw nations include LLLLLL, XXXXXX, ANYWHR.
B. Output
High speed printer output of the several sample flight contracts sub-
jected to processing is shown in Table 3.
T. Burleson J. Keough
1969]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
TABLE 1
MAIN PROGRAM (LANGUAGE: FORTRAN V)
EXTERNAL TYMCK
INTEGER H,M,W,KU,NR,WRKMAT,WARMAT,HAGMAT,N,L
DIMENSION HAGMAT (51), WARMAT (12 1)
COMMON /A1/ N,WRKMAT (20,2)
CALL TYMCK ( 15 ,$ 55)
DO 880 I = 1,51
READ 901, HAGMAT (I)
PRINT 902, HAGMAT (I)
880 CONTINUE
DO 881 I = 1,121
READ 901, WARMAT (I)
PRINT 902, WARMAT (I)
881 CONTINUE
901 FORMAT (A6)




DO 003 ICNT = 1,N














IF (H.NE. 1) GO TO 102
W=1
GO TO 103
102 L - 121
CALL FLIGHT (W,WARMAT,L)
IF (W .EQ. 0) GO TO 104
103 CALL MONT (M,KU)
104 I H + 2 *W + 4 * M + 1
GO TO (105,106,107,106,105,108,109,108),I
105 PRINT 205
205 FORMAT (53H THIS IS NOT AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT. AC,
L/51H CORDINGLY, THERE IS NO LIMITATION TO THE LIABIL,
L/51H ITY. UNDER THE WARSAW, HAGUE, OR MONTREAL
L/51H AGREEMENTS. HOWEVER, LOCAL LAW MAY ESTABLISH A,
L/ 5 1H LIMITATION OF LIABILITY.
GO TO 150
106 PRINT 206
206 FORMAT (53H THIS IS AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT ACCORD,
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L/51H ING TO THE WARSAW CONVENTION AND THE HAGUE,
L/51H PROTOCOL. HOWEVER, THE MONTREAL INTERIM
L/51H AGREEMENT DOES NOT APPLY, SO THE LIMIT OF
L/51H LIABILITY IS $16,580.
GO TO 110
107 PRINT 207
207 FORMAT (53H THIS IS NOT AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT AC,
L/51H CORDING TO THE WARSAW CONVENTION. HOWEVER, ,
L/51H NEITHER THE HAGUE PROTOCOL NOR THE MONTREAL ,
L/51H INTERIM AGREEMENT APPLY, SO THE LIMIT OF
L/51H LIABILITY IS $8,290.
GO TO 110
108 PRINT 208
208 FORMAT (53H THIS IS AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT ACCORD,
L/51H ING TO THE WARSAW CONVENTION, THE HAGUE
L/51H PROTOCOL, AND THE MONTREAL AGREEMENT.
L/51H THEREFOR, THE LIMIT OF LIABILITY IS $75,000.
GO TO 110
109 PRINT 209
209 FORMAT (53H THIS IS AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT ACCORD,
L/51H ING TO THE WARSAW CONVENTION. THE HAGUE
L/51H PROTOCOL DOESN'T APPLY. HOWEVER, THE MONTREAL,
L/51H INTERIM AGREEMENT DOES, AND THE LIMIT OF
L/51H LIABILITY IS $75,000. "
110 IF ( NR .EQ. 1) GO TO 150
IF (KU.NE. 1) GO TO 111
PRINT 210
210 FORMAT (53H NOT INCLUDING COLONIES, PROTECTORATES, ,
L/51H TERRITORIES UNDER MANDATE, OR ANY OTHER
L/51H TERRITORY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. THESE ARE
L/51H TREATED SEPARATELY.
111 IF (M.EQ. 0 ) GO TO 150
PRINT 211
211 FORMAT (53H THIS IS SUBJECT TO THE RESERVATION THAT,
L/51H THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE WARSAW ,
L/51H CONVENTION SHALL NOT APPLY TO INTERNATIONAL ,
L/51H TRANSPORTATION THAT MAY BE PERFORMED BY THE ,
L/51H UNITED STATES OR ANY TERRITORY OR POSSESSION
L/51H UNDER ITS JURISDICTION.
CALL EXCEPT (NR)
112 IF (NR .EQ. 0) GO TO 150
PRINT 212
212 FORMAT (53H THE UNITED STATES REGARDS THE ADHEREN ,
L/51H CE TO THE WARSAW CONVENTION BY THE PEOPLE'S
L/51H REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S
L/51H REPUBLIC OF KOREA, AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC ,
L/51H REPUBLIC AS BEING WITHOUT LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE.
L/51H SO, DELETING THOSE COUNTRIES,
GO TO 101
















108 DO 109 I-I,L
IF (WRKMAT(J,1).EQ.HCPMAT(I))GO TO 110
109 CONTINUE
GO TO 199
110 DO 111 K=1,N
IF(WRKMAT(K,2) .EQ.IA)GO TO 112
111 CONTINUE
GO TO 199
112 DO 113 I-I,L
IF (HCPMAT (I) .EQ. WRKMAT (K,1))GO TO 114
113 CONTINUE
GO TO 199
114 IF(WRKMAT (K,1) .EQ. WRKMAT(J,1))GO TO 115
NES = 1
GO TO 106
115 IF(N .GT. 2)GO TO 116
GO TO 199
116 DO 118 I=I,N
IF(WRKMAT (1,2) .NE.II)GO TO 118












COMMON/Al/ N, WRKMAT (20,2)
DATA RDC/'RDCHIN'/,XRC/'XRDCHI'/,RDK/'RDKORE'/,XRK/
'XRDKOR'/
DO 101 J = 1,N
IF(WRKMAT(J,1) .NE. RDC) GO TO 102
WRKMAT (J,1) = XRC
NR= 1
102 IF( WRKMAT (J,1) .NE. RDK ) GO TO 101
WRKMAT (J,1) = XRK
NR = 1
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DO 101 J-- 1,N
IF ( WRKMAT (J,I) .NE. USA) GO TO 102
M-- 1







ALGERI DENMAR LIECHT ROMANI
AUSTLA EL SAL LUXEMB SENEGA
BELGUI FRANCE MALAGA SPAIN
BRAZIL GERDEM MALI SWEDEN
BULGAR GERFED MEXICO SWITZE
BYELOR GREECE NEPAL SYRIA
CAMERO HUNGAR NETHER TUNISI
CANADA ICELAN NEW ZE UKRAIN
COLUMB IRELAN NIGER USSR
CONBRA ISRAEL NORWAY UAR
CUBA ITALY PAKIST VENEZU
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GUYANA U BRUN CAMERO PAKIST
INDONE U CHAN CANADA POLAND
JAMAIC U FALK COLUMB PORTUG
JAPAN U FIJI CONBRA ROMANI
KENYA U GIBR CUBA SENEGA
RDKORE U GILB CZECHO SPAIN
LATVIA U HONG DAHOME SWEDEN
LEBANO U LEEW DENMAR SWITZE
LESOTH U MAUR EL SAL SYRIA
LIBERI U N BN FRANCE TUNISI
MALAWA U S RH GERDEM UKRAIN
MALAYS U SHEL GERFED USSR
MALTA U SARA GREECE UAR
MAURIT U SEYC HUNGAR VENEZU









THIS IS AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT ACCORDING TO THE WARSAW
CONVENTION. THE HAGUE PROTOCOL DOESN'T APPLY. HOWEVER,
THE MONTREAL INTERIM AGREEMENT DOES, AND THE LIMIT OF
LIABILITY IS $75,000.
THIS IS SUBJECT TO THE RESERVATION THAT THE FIRST PARA-
GRAPH OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION SHALL NOT
APPLY TO INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION THAT MAY BE PER-
FORMED BY THE UNITED STATES OR ANY TERRITORY OR POSSES-
SION UNDER ITS JURISDICTION. THE UNITED STATES REGARDS THE
ADHERENCE TO THE WARSAW CONVENTION BY THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
KOREA, AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AS BEING
WITHOUT LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE. SO, DELETING THOSE COUNTRIES,
THIS IS AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT ACCORDING TO THE WARSAW
CONVENTION. THE HAGUE PROTOCOL DOESN'T APPLY. HOWEVER,
THE MONTREAL INTERIM AGREEMENT DOES, AND THE LIMIT OF
LIABILITY IS $75,000.
THIS IS SUBJECT TO THE RESERVATION THAT THE FIRST PARA-
GRAPH OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION SHALL NOT
APPLY TO INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION THAT MAY BE PER-
FORMED BY THE UNITED STATES OR ANY TERRITORY OR POSSE-




THIS IS AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT ACCORDING TO THE WARSAW
CONVENTION. THE HAGUE PROTOCOL DOESN'T APPLY. HOWEVER,
THE MONTREAL INTERIM AGREEMENT DOES, AND THE LIMIT OF
LIABILITY IS $75,000.
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THIS IS SUBJECT TO THE RESERVATION THAT THE FIRST PARA-
GRAPH OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION SHALL NOT
APPLY TO INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION THAT MAY BE
PERFORMED BY THE UNITED STATES OR ANY TERRITORY OR




THIS IS NOT AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT. ACCORDINGLY, THERE
IS NO LIMITATION TO THE LIABILITY. UNDER THE WARSAW,
HAGUE, OR MONTREAL AGREEMENTS. HOWEVER, LOCAL LAW MAY




THIS IS AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT ACCORDING TO THE WARSAW
CONVENTION. HOWEVER, NEITHER THE HAGUE PROTOCOL NOR
THE MONTREAL INTERIM AGREEMENT APPLY, SO THE LIMIT OF
LIABILITY IS $8,290.
NOT INCLUDING COLONIES, PROTECTORATES, TERRITORIES UNDER
MANDATE, OR ANY OTHER TERRITORY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.




THIS IS NOT AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT. ACCORDINGLY, THERE
IS NO LIMITATION TO THE LIABILITY. UNDER THE WARSAW,
HAGUE, OR MONREAL AGREEMENTS. HOWEVER, LOCAL LAW MAY









THIS IS NOT AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT. ACCORDINGLY, THERE
IS NO LIMITATION TO THE LIABILITY, UNDER THE WARSAW,
HAGUE, OR MONTREAL AGREEMENTS. HOWEVER, LOCAL LAW MAY




THIS IS AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT ACCORDING TO THE WARSAW
CONVENTION. THE HAGUE PROTOCOL DOESN'T APPLY. HOWEVER,
THE MONTREAL INTERIM AGREEMENT DOES, AND THE LIMIT OF
LIABILITY IS $75,000.
THIS IS SUBJECT TO THE RESERVATION THAT THE FIRST PARA-
GRAPH OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION SHALL NOT
APPLY TO INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION THAT MAY BE
PERFORMED BY THE UNITED STATES OR ANY TERRITORY OR
POSSESION UNDER ITS JURISDICTION. THE UNITED STATES RE-
GARDS THE ADHERENCE TO THE WARSAW CONVENTION BY THE
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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUB-
LIC OF KOREA, AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AS
BEING WITHOUT LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE. SO, DELETING THOSE
COUNTRIES, THIS IS NOT AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT. ACCORD-
INGLY, THERE IS NO LIMITATION TO THE LIABILITY. UNDER THE
WARSAW, HAGUE, OR MONTREAL AGREEMENTS. HOWEVER, LOCAL








THIS IS AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT ACCORDING TO THE WARSAW
CONVENTION AND THE HAGUE PROTOCOL. HOWEVER, THE MON-
TREAL INTERIM AGREEMENT DOES NOT APPLY, SO THE LIMIT OF
LIABILITY IS $16,580.
Warsaw Convention - Liability Limitation -
Constitutionality
On 4 March 1966, an aircraft owned by Canadian Pacific Airlines, en-
route from Hong Kong to Tokyo, crashed, killing a United States citizen.
The deceased had purchased his ticket in Singapore where he was residing
at the time of the accident. A wrongful death action was instituted by the
widow of the deceased against Canadian Pacific Airlines in the Cook
County, Illinois, Circuit Court. The defendant airline moved for a dis-
missal of the complaint, arguing that the fatal international flight was
governed by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention,1 and that under
the Convention the forum court lacked jurisdiction and proper venue.
Implicit in defendant's contention was the argument that recoverable
damages under Warsaw should be limited to that provided in the Conven-
tion, which is approximately $8, 300. Held, motion for dismissal denied:
The Warsaw Convention is not applicable where a nation has neither ad-
hered to nor ratified the Warsaw Convention at the time of the crash.
Alternatively, if the Convention does apply, then the limited liability pro-
vision is inapplicable. Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 10 Av.
Cas. 18,151 (1968).
The instant court presented two alternative findings to uphold its de-
cision; however, this paper is only concerned with the applicability of the
limited liability provision In support of this alternative finding the court
pursued two distinct lines of reasoning. The first declared the limitation
inapplicable because the notice requirements of Lisa v. Alitalia Airlines"
were not met; in its second approach the court developed a novel theory
that the Warsaw limitation on liability is unconstitutional as a violation
of the due process clause of the United States Constitution. This limita-
tion was held "arbitrary, irresponsible, capricious, and indefensible, as
applied to this case, in that such provisions would attempt to impose a
damage limitation of considerably less than the undisputed pecuniary losses
and damages involved in this case."' The judicial declaration holding this
'Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air (hereinafter cited as the Warsaw Convention), 29 Oct. 1934, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876
(concluded at Warsaw, Poland, 12 Oct. 1929).
'Warsaw Convention, art. 22(1), 49 Stat. 3019, T.S. No. 876, provides in part: "(1) In the
transportation of passengers, the liability for each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000
Francs (approximately $8,300) ....
'An inquiry into the validity of the first finding requires an examination of Article I of the
Convention; however, this is beyond the scope of this paper. It should be noted that the applica-
bility of the Convention is not determined solely upon whether the country has ratified or adhered
to the treaty. New countries may be bound by treaty obligations of the parent country.
'Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.P.A., 253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 370
F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 455 (1968), rehearing denied, 391 U.S. 929
(1968). For a discussion of this case, see Note, 33 J. Air L. & Com. 698 (1967).
5 Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 10 Av. Cas. 18,151, 18,161 (1968).
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treaty provision unconstitutional has serious implications'-implications
which necessitate a more thorough analysis of the constitutional issue than
was offered by the Burdell opinion.
I. THE WARSAW CONVENTION
The Warsaw Convention provision limiting air carrier liability in cases
of wrongful death to approximately $ 8,300 has been a point of considerable
discussion since Warsaw was adhered to by the United States. At the time
the Convention was established most of the discussion centered upon the
proper amount for its limitation. The arguments for higher limits were
based upon the theory that many of the developed countries had awards
in personal injury and death actions which were much higher than the
limit set forth in Warsaw.' Although the United States adhered to the
Convention, "it has never been universally acclaimed here because of the
low limitations it imposes. . . ." The hostility prevalent in this country
toward Warsaw's low limitation has been exhibited by the legal commu-
nity,9 in court opinions, 10 and in the attitude of the United States Govern-
ment itself. In 1965 the United States officially expressed its dissatisfaction
with the $8,300 limitation when it threatened to denounce the Warsaw
Convention unless the maximum recovery limit was raised." The threat
resulted in the formulation of the Montreal Agreement," in which the
limit on liability was raised to $75,000 under certain circumstances. 3
Prior to the present opinion, the courts did not base their decisions upon
an open expression of displeasure with the Convention's limitation. Rather
they sought principles by which to limit the applicability of Article 22.
For example, courts have held that both the delivery of and the printing
' The ramifications in international law of declaring a treaty unconstitutional are beyond the
scope of this paper. However, it should be noted that courts will consider the international aspects
in reaching a decision.
Lowenfeld & Mendelson, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REN .
497, 504 (1967).
SMoore & Pelaez, Admiralty Jurisdiction-The Sky's the Limit, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 3, 28
(1967).
'Kreindler, Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31 J. AIR L. & COM. 291 (1965).
"For a discussion of the courts' hostility toward the Warsaw Convention's liability limitation,
see Note, 35 J. AIR L. & CoM. 123 (1969).
"Dep't State Press Release No. 268, 15 Nov. 1965; see also N.Y. Times, 16 Nov. 1965, p. 82,
col. 1 (city ed.); for a general discussion of the events leading up to the denunciation, see Kreind-
ler, supra note 9; see also Cabranes, Limitations of Liability in International Air Law: The Warsaw
and Rome Conventions Reconsidered, 15 INT'L & CoMr. L.Q. 660 (1966); Kelliher, The Draft
Convention on Aerial Collisions: Some Textual Criticisms, 32 J. AIR L. & CoM. 564 (1966);
Lacey, Recent Developments in the Warsaw Convention, 33 J. AIR L. & CoM. 385 (1967); Miyagi,
"Applicable Limits of Liability" Under Article 8 of the 1964 Draft Convention on Aerial Collisions,
32 J. AIR L. & COM. 195 (1966).
"The 1966 Agreement was formally approved by the CAB in 1966. Agreement Relating to
Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, CAB Docket No. 17325,
CAB Order No. E-23680, CAB Agreement No. 18900 (13 May 1966). See also The Warsaw Con-
vention-Recent Developments and the 'Withdrawal of the United States Denunciation, 32 J. AIR
L. & COM. 243 (1966); Fitzgerald, Liability Rules in the International Carriage of Passengers of
Air and the Notice of Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention of the United States of America,
4 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 194 (1966); Levine, Warsaw Convention: Treaty Under Pressure, 16 CLEv.-
MAR. L. REV. 327 (1967); Sincoff, Absolute Liability and Increased Damages in International Avia-
tion Accidents, 52 A.B.A. J. 1122 (1966).
12 Generally the $75,000 limitation is applicable if the contract of carriage includes a point in
the United States as a point of origin, point of destination, or agreed stopping place.
[Vol. 3 5
CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
on the ticket must meet strict standards before the Convention's limita-
tion will be applied."'
I. WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTES-AN ANALOGY
Although Burdell is the first attempt by a court to question, specifically,
the constitutionality of the Warsaw liability limitation, the courts are
well acquainted with the question of the constitutionality of limited lia-
bility as found in statutes involving recovery for wrongful death. A dis-
cussion of some of these statutes and the courts' constitutional treatment
of limited liability provisions therein may provide a basis upon which to
hold Warsaw's limitation constitutional. No right of recovery for the
death of a human being was recognized at common law. Dissatisfaction in
England with this inadequacy resulted in the passage of the Lord Camp-
bell's Act in 1846" which provided a cause of action for wrongful death
in circumstances in which the deceased could have sued for his injuries
if he had not died." The theory of this statute was adopted in the United
States, and today there are wrongful death statutes in all of the states.'
Initially many of these statutes contained provisions restricting the
amount of possible recovery. While most states abolished the maximum
recovery provisions, eight states still have such limitations." In Illinois,
the forum for Burdell, and one of these eight states, the liability limitation
was attacked as contravening the Constitution. In answering this conten-
tion, one Illinois Court" held that the constitutional issue did not create
too difficult a problem since, at common law, there was no right of re-
covery for wrongful death. The court stated that:
The legislature took away no right when it enacted the statute. It created
both the right and the remedy and we think that its power to limit the
maximum recovery in the action that it created can not be questioned
[Emphasis added.].'o
The court went on to say that the validity of the limitation, as well as
the legislature's power to limit recovery, are not affected by an unduly
low limitation; nor are they affected by the failure of most wrongful
death statutes to provide a maximum limitation upon recovery.' In
"4 For a historical discussion of the requirements concerning notice and delivery, see Note, 35
J. Air L. & Com. 123 (1969).
"For the text of the Act see S. SPEISER, RECOVERy FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 773 (1966).
16 SPEISER, supra note 15, at § 1:7.
17 1d. at § 1:8.









"SHall v. Gillins, 13 Ill.2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352, 354 (1958).
20Id. at 354.
" Id. at 354; A later Illinois court upheld the legislature's power to create the cause of action
and limit the amount of recovery thereunder. Butler v. Chicago Transit Authority, 38 Il. 2d 361,
231 N.E.2d 429 (1967).
1969]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Missouri, where the wrongful death statute also contains a limitation on
liability,' a court held that the limitation was constitutional because the
legislature "created the right of action where none existed before, and ...
may condition the right as it sees fit [Emphasis added.]."" The wrongful
death statutes mentioned above illustrate that a statute which creates a
right of recovery for wrongful death may constitutionally impose a limit
on the amount of recovery thereunder.
If Warsaw's limitation on liability can be analogized to wrongful death
statutes containing similar limitations, which have been held constitutional,
there would seem to be sufficient legal precedent upon which to base the
constitutionality of Warsaw. Although these limitations appear analogous
there are two differences which require reconciliation before the analogy
can stand. The constitutional attacks against the state wrongful death
statutes involve the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
whereas the attack against the Warsaw Convention involves the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendent. The aforementioned cases attacking the
liability limitations of state wrongful death statutes involved govern-
mental regulation of economic interests. 4 Since the courts have determined
that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have almost the same meaning
when concerned with such regulations," the above distinction does not
destroy the analogy.
The second difference is more difficult to reconcile. This difference stems
from the decision in Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolanae which held that
the Warsaw Convention does not create a cause of action for wrongful
death. The court stated:
[W]e agree ... that the Convention [Warsaw] did not create an independ-
ent right of action .... Secretary of State Hull's letter to President Roosevelt
... indicated that the effect of Article 17 on which plaintiffs rely for their
argument was only to create a presumption of liability, leaving it for local
law to grant the right of action. 7
Since the constitutionality of limited liability provisions in wrongful death
statutes is based upon the statutes' creation of a right of recovery for
wrongful death, and since Warsaw does not create such a right of action,
it would appear that the analogy may not be valid.
However, upon closer examination resolution of this difference is pos-
sible. One method is to show that the Noel decision was improperly de-
22SPEISER, supra note 15, at S 7:2 (Supp. 1968).
z Glick v. Ballentine Produce Inc., 396 S.W.2d 609, 615 (Mo. 1965):
We find nothing in plaintiff's citations or arguments which indicate any constitutional
infirmity in a limitation on the amount of recovery in a death action. The legislature
created the right of action where none existed before, and it may condition the right
as it sees fit. It is worthy of note that we have not been cited a single case nor have
we found any where this limitation on recovery has been questioned in Missouri as
unconstitutional.
See also Cogger v. Trudell, 35 Wis. 2d 350, 151 N.W.2d 146, 151 (1967).
24 See p. 264 infra.
" W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPE, THE AMERICAN CONSTrrUTION 361 (1964).
2'247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957).
27 Id. at 679.
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cided.U One article 9 in attacking Noel, has stated that there was no rational
basis for the decision. The authors doubted whether another United States
court would be willing to follow that decision if the wrongful death
occurred during a flight which was governed by the Convention limitation,
but which occurred in a place where there was no local statute creating a
right of recovery for that death. In that situation, under Noel, there
could be no recovery at all. The authors stated that:
Logic, reason, and analogous legal precedence compel a contrary result and
a holding that the Convention . . does create a substantive right even though
it looks to the forum subsequently chosen to provide much of the procedural
mechanization for enforcing that right.'
Although the Noel opinion may be subject to meritorious criticism, the
decision is still controlling. Accordingly, any serious attempt to analogize
Warsaw's liability limitation and similar limitations in wrongful death
statutes must be done within the context of the Noel decision.
Two arguments, based upon the Noel decision, can be made which will
reconcile the problem created by it. Under Noel, Warsaw's limitation upon
recovery is only applicable where there is a local wrongful death statute."'
It is the local wrongful death statute which creates the right of recovery;
therefore, Warsaw's failure to create such a right is not fatal to the analogy.
Furthermore, if a legislature can constitutionally limit recovery under a
wrongful death statute, then since Warsaw's limit is only applicable under
a local wrongful death statute (Noel), it seems constitutionally permissible
for Warsaw, as international legislation, to likewise limit the recovery.
Implicit in the above arguments is the doctrine that a treaty such as
the Warsaw Convention can preempt state law. This doctrine was enunci-
ated by the Supreme Court in 188052 when it stated that under Article
Six of the Constitution' which declares that treaties shall be the supreme
law of the land, if state legislation could prevail over a treaty, then such
a treaty could not be the supreme law of the land. The Court stated:
It is the declared will of the people of the United States that every treaty
made by the authority of the United States shall be superior to the consti-
tution and laws of any individual states. ......
2 For an excellent discussion supporting the theory that Noel was improperly decided, see
Calkins, The Cause of Action Under The Warsaw Convention, 26 J. Air L. & Com. 217, 223
(1959); see also, Lowenfeld & Mendelson, supra note 7; Moore & Pelaez, supra note 8.
29 Moore & Pelaez, supra note 8.
0 Id. at 31.
" Noel v. L.A.V., 247 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1957):
[W]e agree . . . that the Convention [Warsaw] did not create an independent right
of action. . . . Secretary of State Hull's letter to President Roosevelt . . . indicated
that the effect of Article 17 on which plaintiffs rely for their argument was only
to create a presumption of liability, leaving it for local law to grant the right of
action.
"
2 Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879).
3 U.S. CONST. art. VI states in part:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Author-
ity of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges of
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
34 Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 489 (1879). See also, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416 (1920).
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If a treaty is superior to state law, then one may presume that the liability
provision of Warsaw can preempt any provision similar to that of the
treaty existing under local wrongful death statutes. The above mentioned
differences between Warsaw's limitation and similar limitations in wrong-
ful death statutes do not seem to affect the logic of the analogy for the
reasons given above; therefore, by analogy, there appears to be ample case
law to support the constitutionality of the limited liability provision of
Warsaw.
III. DuE PROCESS AND REGULATION OF AN ECONOMIC INTEREST
Even if the above analogy is inappropriate, it would appear that there
is a second, and perhaps more fundamental, theory which undermines the
basis upon which the Burdell court held Warsaw's limitation to be a depri-
vation of due process. The instant court correctly stated that the treaty
power of the United States is not free from all restraints. In Reid v.
Covert' the Supreme Court said that the prohibitions of the Constitution
were designed to apply to all branches of the government, and these pro-
hibitions could not be nullified by an agreement with foreign nations.
No treaty could confer upon Congress power the exercise of which was
prohibited by the Constitution. The Court went on to say:
The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited
except by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the
actions of the government or its departments ... "
The rule implicit in the reasoning of the Reid opinion is that treaties are
subject to the express prohibitions of the Federal Constitution and are to
be treated the same as Acts of Congress with regard to these prohibitions.
One such prohibition is found in the Fifth Amendment which provides
in part that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property with-
out due process of law."3 It is upon this due process clause that the Burdell
court found Warsaw's liability limitation unconstitutional. Accordingly,
an examination of the Supreme Court's attitude toward this due process
clause is necessary, for an analysis of the Court's rules concerning due
process and governmental regulation of economic interests will reveal the
instant court's fallacious reasoning for declaring Warsaw's limitation to
be unconstitutional. At the outset it should be noted that, as mentioned
previously, the Warsaw Convention's limitation is a regulation of an
economic intereste-an interest in recovery of money damages, as dis-
tinguished from a fundamental interest such as freedom of the person."
3a 3 54 U.S. 1 (1957).3 11d. at 16-17.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
" For an excellent discussion of the due process clause and governmental regulations of economic
and property rights, see generally, 2 B. SWARTZ, THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY, Chap. 12 & 13 (1965).
s The courts apply a different test when speaking of legislation intended to regulate certain
fundamental rights than they do when viewing legislation concerned with economic or property
rights. The Supreme Court has stated:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of
man. . . . We mention these matters . . . in emphasis of our view that strict
scrutiny . . . is essential ....
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The Supreme Court's attitude toward due process and governmental
regulation of economic rights has developed over a period of years virtually
into a "hands-off" policy. Courts have found that the due process clause
is not violated so long as the governmental regulation is reasonably cal-
culated to promote a valid end.' However, few limitations are placed upon
the ends the government wants to achieve through regulation. Generally,
the courts have found that the government, in exercise of its power, can
regulate to promote the general welfare, which includes such concepts as
the economic interest of the society, the social interest in general progress,
and other equally broad principles.41 Similarly, the courts have liberally
construed the legal definition of what constituted a reasonable regulation
in relation to the end sought to be achieved. In Nebbia v. New York"
the Court stated that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' due process
clauses did not prohibit governmental regulation for the general welfare.
It held that due process merely conditions the governmental regulation
"by securing that the end shall be accomplished by methods consistent
with due process." The court set down the classic definition of due
process in this situation when it stated:
[T]he guaranty of due process . . . demands only that the law shall not be
unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected shall have
a substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained."
The rule derived from the Nebbia decision is that so long as governmental
legislation passes the reasonableness test-so long as there is a reasonable
relation between the ends sought and the means employed-such legisla-
tion will not violate the due process clause.
The Supreme Court opinions cited indicate the standard to be used in
determining due process, but do not explain "how the reasonableness test
itself is to be applied in specific cases. More particularly, whose concep-
tion of reasonableness with regard to . . . valid legislation is to control-
that of the legislator or that of the judge [Emphasis added.]?" In re-
sponse to this question, the Supreme Court has developed the notion that the
courts should not substitute their opinions of the regulation's reasonable-
ness for that of the legislature. Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Lochner
v. New York," first introduced this policy when he stated that a statute
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The Supreme Court illustrated the distinction
between fundamental and economic rights when it stated:
The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include,
so far as due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a
legislature may have a "rational basis" for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of
press, of assembly . . . may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are
susceptible of restrictions only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests
which the State may lawfully protect . . . [Emphasis added.].
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
"See generally, Tregle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936); Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Leggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928); Clutter v. Blanken-
ship, 144 S.W.2d 119 (Mo. 1940).
41 SWARTZ, supra note 38, at 94.
4291 U.S. 502 (1934).
41Id. at 525.
"4 Id.
41 SWARTZ, supra note 38, at 53.
40 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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should not be declared invalid "unless it can be said that a rational and
fair man necessarily would admit that the statute . . . would infringe
fundamental principles as ... understood by ... our people and our law."47
Holmes' dissent was adopted by the majority in subsequent Supreme Court
decisions including Olsen v. Nebraska Western Reference & Bond Ass'n'
in which the court said that it was not concerned with the "wisdom, need
or appropriateness of the legislation." The court felt any changes which
may be needed should be left to the states and to Congress. The Supreme
Court's attitude concerning due process and governmental regulation has
been perhaps best expressed by Mr. Justice Douglas." He stated that the
courts are not a super-legislature, and should not determine the consti-
tutionality of legislation on the basis of any particular economic theory."
In view of the Supreme Court decisions it appears that the court in
Burdell did not apply the correct due process standard to be used in de-
termining the constitutionality of Warsaw's limited liability provisions.
The instant court found that Warsaw's liability limitation violated the
due process clause because it was "arbitrary, irresponsible, capricious,
and indefensible as applied to this case, in that such provisions would at-
tempt to impose a damage limitation of considerably less than the undis-
puted pecuniary losses and damages involved in this case." The court used
the correct words to declare this provision unconstitutional, but failed to
consider the correct application of these words. The Supreme Court, as
stated in Nebbia, requires that the law be "unreasonable, arbitrary, and
capricious" in relation to the ends sought to be obtained. The Burdell court
found the law "unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious" in relation to what
it thought should be the correct measure of recovery for wrongful death.
In determining that the limitation on liability was too low, the Burdell
court failed to follow the rulings that courts should not substitute their
own determination of what is reasonable for that of the legislature. This
substitution is clearly contrary to the above mentioned Supreme Court
rulings.
Hostility toward Warsaw's liability limitation has never been more
evident. While in the past the courts have found a variety of ways to
4
1 Id. at 76.
48 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
49 1d. at 246. See also, Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952). In 1959 the
Supreme Court stated:
[W]e must recognize that the Due Process Clause can be thought to interpose a bar
only if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification utterly lacking in ra-
tional justification.
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1959).
5OW. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 282 (1956).
.. The most recent case upholding the view that Courts should not substitute their views for
that of the legislature is Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-31 (1962):
We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not sub-
stitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who
are elected to pass laws. . . . Legislative bodies have broad scope to experiment with
economic problems, and this Court does not sit to "subject the State to an intolerable
supervision hostile to the basic principles of our Government and wholly beyond the
protection which the general clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to
secure." . . . We refuse to sit as a "super-legislature to weight the wisdom of legisla-
tion."
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circumvent this limitation, it seems evident that the provision cannot
validly be attacked on constitutional grounds. Should an appellate court
reach the issue of constitutionality," it is unlikely that it would find War-
saw's limited liability provision violative of due process and therefore un-
constitutional.
Charles F. Plenge
"'It is unlikely that higher courts, on appeal, will reach the constitutionality of Warsaw since
the rule of constitutional construction is that a court will not reach a constitutional question
unless absolutely necessary. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 538 (1911); Siler v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909); Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 53
(1908).
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Administrative Law - Ashbacker Doctrine
CAB Discretion
National Airlines and Delta Air Lines petitioned the United States Court
of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, to review several orders of the
Civil Aeronautics Board (hereinafter CAB or Board). The case arose out
of the CAB's commencement, in 1967, of an evaluation of the need for
additional air service in the South where the petitioning carriers had held
principal southern transcontinental routes since 1961. The Board limited
its investigation to eighteen specific geographic points. Petitioners' motion
to consolidate their applications involving service to southern cities other
than those specified was denied, and the Board set separate comparative
area route making proceedings to consider these excluded applications. On
appeal, petitioners contended that the challenged orders were an abuse of
agency discretion and deprived them of their rights under the Ashbacker
doctrine. The Board defended on the grounds that its main objective in
delineating five comparative area hearings was to prevent expansion of the
proceedings to unmanageable proportions. Held: While it must remain
cognizant of the necessity for a fair comparative hearing on mutually ex-
clusive applications, the CAB is free to exercise a considerable measure of
discretion in defining the scope of air route cases. The Board is not neces-
sarily prohibited by Ashbaclzer from considering, in a separate proceeding,
an area that borders on, or even lies wholly within, the area covered in a
proceeding then before it. The orders in the instant case, not being final
without an effective deprivation of the applicants' rights, are denied review.
National Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 392 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir., 1968).
Dealing with administrative law, the Supreme Court held in Ashbacker
Radio Corp. v. FCC1 that where two bona fide applications for the same
radio frequency are filed, the grant of one without a hearing on both
deprives the loser of an opportunity to be heard. The deprivation of an
applicant's right to be heard is considered a breach of procedural due
process.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE ASHBACKER DOCTRINE
Prior to Ashbacker, judicial acquiescence to administrative discretion
had been affirmed in FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.' The FCC had
denied an application on a ground which the reviewing court found un-
supported, and the court had remanded. The Commission set the case for
1 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
'See Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1956). Persons
who are licensed for "the public convenience and necessity" have no proprietary rights in their
license. Substantive due process will insure fairness where Congress has chosen to confer upon an
applicant the opportunity to be heard.
3309 U.S. 134 (1940).
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argument with two rival applications for the same facilities. On a second
appeal the court of appeals granted a writ of mandamus commanding the
Commission to hear the original application on the original record. The
Supreme Court, in reversing, held that it was obligated to follow the Com-
mission's interpretation of its rules of practice as to the manner in which
applications should be considered.4
On the question of the Commission's function, the Court noted that
the agency had been created to serve as an expert body in executing Con-
gressional legislative policy. By the terms of the Federal Communications
Act the Congress intended for the FCC to be a "supple instrument for the
exercise of discretion." 5 Rules of procedure in such areas as the scope of an
inquiry, the hearing of applications and the rights of intervention are to
be formulated by the Commission. In promulgating these rules the agency's
discretion is to be restricted only by the basic concept of protecting private
and public interests-a concept of fundamental fairness.
The Ashbacker case involved an application to the FCC for authority to
construct a new radio station to operate on 1230kc filed by Fetzer Broad-
casting Co. Subsequently Ashbacker Radio Corp. filed its application to
change the frequency of its existing station to 1230kc. Before Ashbacker
filed, the Commission had taken no action on the Fetzer application. In an
ex parte proceeding Fetzer's application was unconditionally granted by the
FCC. Such grant, the Commission noted, did not preclude it from taking
subsequent action on Ashbacker's application.'
The Supreme Court held that the Ashbacker application was effectively
denied by the granting of Fetzer's application. Congress had expressly
guaranteed the right to a hearing before an application is denied.' The
applications were mutually exclusive, and the Court held that the Commis-
son exceeded its authority by granting the Fetzer application without
hearing Ashbacker's. The Court reasoned that a subsequent hearing, as the
FCC suggested was possible, would amount to a hearing on the revocation
or modification of an outstanding license. Because of the difficulty in dis-
placing an established licensee, granting the Fetzer petition imposed a
greater burden on Ashbacker.' Under the circumstances this increased bur-
den was unwarranted-Ashbacker should have been allowed a hearing
for an available frequency.
II. ASHBACKER AND THE CAB
A. Problems Of Mutual Exclusivity
The problem of mutual exclusivity, though easily seen in cases before
the FCC (because two applications obviously cannot broadcast on the
same frequency), is less clear in air route certification cases before the
CAB. Physical exclusiveness is generally not present in certification pro-
ceedings, aside from questions of safety and terminal facilities. When con-
4 1d. at 143.
5 Id. at 138.
6 326 U.S. at 330.
778 Stat. 194, 47 U.S.C. 5 309(b) (1964).
8326 U.S. at 332.
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sidering applications, the Board's determination is necessarily an economic
choice.9 Although it is possible for more than one air carrier to serve the
same route, economic considerations can make air route applications mu-
tually exclusive since the public interest requires that only one application
be approved if the predicted traffic can support only one carrier econom-
ically.'" Should the Board determine that traffic warrants only one carrier,
the certification of an applicant for service over this route precludes a
similar grant to any other applicant in the near future. Thus, if there are
two qualified applicants for this same service, their applications are mu-
tually exclusive.
Even before Ashbacker, the CAB had recognized the necessity for a fair
hearing on mutually exclusive applications." However, since economic
factors form the basis of the test for the existence of mutual exclusivity,
the determination of which applications are mutually exclusive is often a
time-consuming task. Applications are not necessarily mutually exclusive
even though submission of valid applications for the same types of service
have been made by equally qualified carriers. A prerequisite of mutual ex-
clusivity is that the grant of one application must absolutely preclude the
grant of the other." But the fact that a subsequent grant of authority
might cause some diversions of traffic" or result in economic injury to a
competitor, 4 does not make the application mutually exclusive per se.
Procedurally the Board first determines whether the proposed services
will be in the public interest and necessary for public convenience, safety,
or security. After a public hearing to make such a determination, the
Board may consolidate the applications it has on file to find which appli-
cant is "fit, willing, and able" to perform the services in the public inter-
est." Of course, only mutually exclusive applications are required to receive
this comparative consideration. The CAB must determine mutual exclusi-
vity as of the time the applications are considered and the authority
awarded." When mutual exclusivity and the right to an Asbbacker hear-
ing have been established, consolidation is necessary to achieve a hearing
similar to an adversary proceeding. The opportunity must be given appli-
cants to have "all the give-and-take of contesting parties.."' It will not
suffice to have only a "simultaneous hearing" where each application is
considered in separate unconsolidated proceedings. 8
In effect, Ashbacker allows mutually exclusive applicants judicial relief
when denied a comparative hearing by the CAB. Normally interstate route
'National Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 249 F.2d 13, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
"See e.g., Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 275 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 969 (1960).
"Colonial Air Lines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 552 (1944).
12Eastern Airlines, Inc.-Removal of Pittsburgh Restriction, CAB Order No. E-6,235 (20
March 1952).
iaWest Coast Case, 8 C.A.B. 636 (1947).
"'FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
"See Westwood, Procedure in New Route Cases Before the CAB, 14 J. AIR L. & CoM. 267
(1947).
"Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 194 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
"Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 228 F.2d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
1i Id.
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orders of the CAB are not final and, therefore, not reviewable. Review can
be obtained, however, when the orders "impose an obligation, deny a right
or fix some legal relationship [Emphasis added.]."'" To deny an appropri-
ate Ashbacker hearing is to withhold a right from the parties, ' and the
courts will have jurisdiction to review the CAB action.
B. When An Ashbacker Hearing Becomes Appropriate
The question of primary concern, then, is at what point the right to an
Ashbacker hearing arises. The dominant view, as espoused by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which hears the vast major-
ity of appeals from CAB orders, is that any Ashbacker right must be satis-
fied before a certificate is granted. The Ashbacker rule is concerned with
the right to a comparative hearing in general and the issue of mutual ex-
clusivity in particular. In Delta Air Lines v. CAB," (hereinafter Delta) the
court held that the issue of mutual exclusivity must be considered and
decided by the Board at an early stage and upon a proper record. Each
applicant claiming mutual exclusivity must be given the opportunity to
substantiate such claim.
The court in Delta gave the Board three possible procedural channels for
disposing of alleged mutually exclusive applications: (1) Set for hearing
and thereupon decide the issue of exclusivity as a separate and preliminary
issue; (2) proceed to a comparative hearing upon the two applications
without further ado; (3) set for hearing and thereafter decide the merits
of both applications and also the issue of exclusivity." Because of strenuous
opposition to this procedural mandate by the CAB, the courts have given
it a narrow construction. Recognizing the complexities of CAB proceed-
ings, the D.C. Circuit relaxed what appeared in Delta to be a mandatory
requirement for comparative hearings whenever mutual exclusivity is al-
leged. Two years after Delta the court in National Airlines, Inc. v. CAB"
(hereinafter First National) approved the CAB intervention policy saying
this could lead to a comparative hearing (satisfying Ashbacker) when
mutual exclusivity is alleged. 4 So the requisite of determining mutual ex-
clusivity before grant of application may be satisfied by allowing one ap-
plicant to intervene and present evidence in the separate hearing begun
upon another's application." Although this is a satisfactory alternative to
costly litigation, there is no immediate opportunity for obtaining the
grant, and intervention may be restricted to only those issues in which the
applicant has a direct interest. °
1"Chicago & So. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948).
2"Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 342 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 934 (1965).
2" 228 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
2 Id. at 22.
2" 249 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
2
4 id. at 15.
"s 14 C.F.R. § 302.14 (1968).
2"Seaboard & W. Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 181 F.2d 515 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963
(1950).
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III. CAB DISCRETIONARY POWERS
Through its delegated powers the CAB must insure the orderly devel-
opment of the air industry in a geographic area. To do so the Board must
be free to exercise broad discretion in limiting the scope of air route cer-
tification cases." Congressional assent to this principle lies in section 1001
of the Federal Aviation Act which gives the CAB the authority to con-
duct its "proceedings in such a manner as will be conducive to the proper
dispatch of business and to the ends of justice."" It is intended that the
Board freely determine application procedures reasonably adapted to the
fair administration of its complex responsibilities. The scope of an in-
quiry was specifically left by Congress for the administrative agency's
own determination," and the courts have recognized that the CAB must
have a measure of discretion in limiting the scope of a given proceeding
regardless of Ashbacker
Where expanding the proceeding by consolidation will transform sig-
nificant cases into nationwide monstrosities, CAB discretion is upheld. 2
In the absence of a clear abuse of discretion the courts do not interfere
with the manner in which the CAB controls its operations." Ashbacker
is a rule of substance, not a "mere prescription of form," and it is founded
on practicalities.' The courts tend not to review the details of agency
procedure. The rule that an order of an administrative agency should not
be reviewed unless it imposes an obligation, denies a right, or fixes some
legal relationship as a consummation of the administrative process was laid
down by the Supreme Court in Chicago So. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
S.S. Corp." Therefore, although it has been held that "the Board cannot,
either intentionally or by the demonstrable effect of an order avoid * * *
the Ashbacker doctrine,"" where the denial of a consolidated hearing is to
prevent an unworkable expansion of proceedings and is not inherently
arbitrary, review has been denied on the basis that such an order is inter-
locutory."
IV. NATIONAL AIRLINES V. CAB
In the instant case, the United States Court of Appeals was asked to
review several CAB orders. The orders in question dealt with comparative
hearings concerning air service in the South. National Airlines and Delta
27Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 275 F.2d 632, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
969 (1960).
2 The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1001, 72 Stat. 788 (1958), 49 U.S.C. S 1481 (1964).
29CAB v. State Airlines, Inc., 338 U.S. 572 (1950).
aoFCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
3' Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 247 F.2d 562, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
2North Am. Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 241 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1957); United Air Lines, Inc.
v. CAB, 228 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
"
2Western Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 184 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1950).
"'Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 228 F.2d 17, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
85333 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1948).
" Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 275 F.2d 632, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 969
(1960).
"7See e.g., National Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 249 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Eastern Air Lines,
Inc. v. CAB, 243 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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Air Lines, petitioners, principally held southern transcontinental routes
prior to 1967. In March, 1967, the CAB instituted an evaluation of the
need for additional services competitive with existing services in the south-
ern markets."8 The Board restricted the investigation to certain specified
cities, and refused to consolidate or consider the petitioners' applications
to other southern cities in the same proceeding. The Board recited its pur-
pose in considering some of the excluded applications in separate proceed-
ings as keeping "the investigation within the manageable proportions and
to focus on those markets where additional unrestricted authority may be
justified."" The Court of Appeals held the CAB orders were not final and
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction to review such orders.
The judiciary will not superintend agency judgment concerning con-
trol of its own calendar.' The determination of what areas are to be in-
cluded in a route proceeding, Ashbacker aside, is particularly within the
Board's discretion.41 Thus, the CAB was within its authority in National
to order hearings for investigating service to one city before investigating
service to another absent a deprivation of rights which would make the
matter reviewable. The court stressed the fact that it would not accept
jurisdiction except when a substantial Ashbacker claim had been presented.
The CAB has denied motions to consolidate several pending cases where
simultaneous consideration of mutually exclusive applications would un-
duly expand the proceeding.' Reviewing courts have stressed that Ash-
backer does not require the Board to conduct a comparative hearing when
cases are pending." Separate or simultaneous hearings are available to the
Board in the handling of its responsibilities before final grant. The court
in the instant case said that the simultaneous investigation of contiguous
areas did not violate Ashbacker. The court took notice of the fact that the
Board in making the award had considered the fundamental fairness rule
of Ashbacker and the criteria of a true area proceeding."' In addition, the
court accepted the Board's stated purpose of limiting the scope of the pro-
ceedings as being within CAB discretion and necessary in complex route
certification cases. The action taken by the Board in the instant case did not
deny the right of an applicant to submit evidence or present arguments to
establish the need for more or different restrictions to be applied to any
authorizations which the Board might issue or to show the existence of
mutual exclusivity. The Board merely kept the proceedings within man-
ageable proportions through an interlocutory order while observing the
fairness requisites of the Ashbacker doctrine. Thus, Ashbacker, as refined
by the court, does not necessarily require the Board to expand proceed-
ings to include abutting segments or prohibit the Board from considering
" Southern Tier Competitive Nonstop Investigation, CAB Doc. No. 18257, CAB Order No.
E-24,847 (10 March 1967).
39Id. at 3.
4 FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940).
41 City of San Antonio v. CAB, 374 F.2d 326, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
42Western Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 184 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1950).
"But cf., Radio Cincinnati, Inc. v. FCC, 177 F.2d 92 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
" See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 275 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
969 (1960).
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in a separate proceeding an area that borders on, or even lies wholly within,
the area covered in another proceeding.
V. CONCLUSION
It appears that the principles of Delta"s have been effectively overruled
by the decision in the instant case. The Court of Appeals has in the past
refused to enforce the mandates of Delta as proper procedural rules but
instead upheld CAB denial of consolidation by distinguishing the factual
situation in Delta and that of the particular case under review. In the
Delta case the Board's basic consideration was the east-west route system
between the Atlantic seaboard and the central United States; Delta's pro-
posed route application was directly within the area under consideration.
In the First National' case the court had refused to allow a petition to re-
view on the basis that, first, the Board, by its intervention procedure, had
granted the applicant a fair opportunity to establish mutual exclusivity
and, second, that National's route application was not directly within the
geographical area under consideration. Therefore, consolidation would un-
duly expand the proceedings into a transcontinental hearing. The courts
have succesfully avoided review by approving the CAB intervention policy
concerning mutual exclusivity; they have gone further in the instant case
by indicating that they would not necessarily review even if the CAB
refused to enlarge proceedings to include abutting segments or set separate
proceedings for an area that borders on, or even lies wholly within, the
area considered in another proceeding.
The court has seen what inequitable results Delta can bring about after
the Board is stripped of a great deal of its discretionary powers. In a dy-
namic industry such as air transportation, it is quite clear that there must
be some limitation to the Ashbacker doctrine. As traffic requirements vary,
a measure of flexibility is needed to set limits on the extent of a given
proceeding. Furthermore flagrant misuse of the Ashbacker doctrine for
tactical purposes ought to be discouraged. Limited inquiries must not be
expanded into massive conglomerates involving the entire air transporta-
tion system. Rather agency judgment exercised under delegated powers
must be given room to operate. In the final analysis the court ought not
to interfere if the Board is not unmindful of Ashbacker rights and has
not placed an unreasonable limitation upon a proceeding.
Joseph H. Lazara
45 Supra note 21.
46 Supra note 23.
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Administrative Law - Agreements No Longer in Force -
Primary Jurisdiction
Appellant, Allied Air Freight International Corporation,' alleging that
Pan American World Airways, Inc. had engaged with Allied's competitor,
Add Airfreight Corporation, in activities violative of the antitrust laws,
claimed treble-damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.' In the alter-
native, appellant asked for actual damages for discrimination pursuant to
Section 404 (b) of the Federal Aviation Act (FAA).' Allied and Add were
air freight forwarders,' consolidating freight in New York and Puerto
Rico and delivering the goods from the destination terminal. Pan American
operated an air carrier service between New York and Puerto Rico, flying
shipments collected by forwarders such as Add and Allied. Appellant
charged that Add and Pan American conspired to damage its established
business by agreeing to exclude its consolidations and favor Add's, with
the result that appellant became insolvent. The agreement had never been
filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) for approval and, at the
time of suit, Add and Pan American were no longer acting under it. The
federal district court ordered that Allied's suit be suspended until the
plaintiff "exhausts its available remedies before the Civil Aeronautics
Board."5 Instead of appearing before the CAB appellant waited until the
district court dismissed the case for want of prosecution and brought this
appeal. Held, reversed: When the CAB is unable to give the relief re-
quested and there is no "arguably lawful" conduct involved, the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction is inapplicable and plaintiff can be heard by the
district court without prior Board action.' Allied Air Freight, Inc. v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 393 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 846 (1968).
Historically, federal district courts have been reluctant to review agree-
'Originally there were two complaints: Allied Air Freight International Corporation and
Allied Air Freight, Inc. Allied Air Freight was declared bankrupt in 1964 and did not appeal the
decision of the lower court. Both corporations had common ownership, officers and operations.
393 F.2d at 441.
'Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). See also, Sherman
Act §§ 1 & 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 (1964).
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 404(b), 72 Stat. 760 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C., 5
1374 (1964).
' Air freight forwarders, like their surface counterparts, are common carriers who consolidate
individual shipments into bulk lots for transportation. In addition, they perform certain other
services, such as picking up freight at the point of origin, delivering it to its ultimate destination
from air terminals, and planning the routing of shipments. Forwarders do not themselves perform
the basic transportation; this is done by an underlying air or surface carrier. National Air Freight
Forwarding Corp. v. CAB, 197 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1952). See also, 34 J. AIR L. & CoM. 298
(1968).
58 Av. Cas. 18,356 (1964).
0 The court also held that even though Allied intentionally obtained a dismissal from the
lower court in order to procure review by the appellate court, the dismissal for want of prosecu-
tion without prejudice was not a voluntary dismissal that would prohibit appeal. See 393 F.2d
at 445.
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ments allegedly involving violations which deal with subjects that could
fall within the jurisdiction of an administrative agency. This reluctance
reflected the judicial policy that, where possible, litigants should obtain
agency rulings, thereby obtaining the benefit of administrative expertise
and being subjected to a uniform system of administration.! The practice of
referring a case to an agency before further judicial action became known
as the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,8 a practice whereby:
Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a par-
ticular agency are secured, and the limited functions of review by the
judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining
and interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that
are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained through
experience, and by more flexible procedure.'
The need for uniformity is especially strong in areas where there may be
an inconsistency between the antitrust laws and the economic regulatory
laws.1" Antitrust laws encourage a policy of free competition, whereas
some of the regulatory laws empower agencies to exempt regulated indus-
tries from such a policy.'1 When an antitrust violation is alleged by a
party subject to agency regulation, the court is inclined to invoke the
primary jurisdiction doctrine to determine the extent to which the regula-
tory agency may have already granted immunization from free competi-
tion policies."
The Supreme Court, in interpreting the intent of the regulatory laws,
has indicated a preference for initial recourse to the regulatory agencies
in antitrust suits," stating in United State Nay. v. Cunard S.S. Co. that
"Congress undoubtedly intended that the [Shipping] Board should possess
the authority primarily to hear and adjudge the matter."'4 Federal appellate
courts have held that initial recourse should be to the administrative agency
when the defendants have made no attempt to obtain Board approval prior
to activity under their restrictive agreements." This rule has been followed
even though the agency had no authority to give the plaintiff the relief
requested. "
The recent decision by the Supreme Court in Carnation Co. v. Pacific
'Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abelene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907); Baltimore & Ohio
R.R. v. United States ex rel Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U.S. 481 (1910).
8 See generally 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 19 (1958); Jaffe, Primary juris-
diction, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1964); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION, 121 (abr. student ed., 1965); Note, 31 J. AIR L. & COM. 47 (1965).
"Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952).
"°See 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 8, at § 19.05; L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINIS-
TRATIVE ACTION, 141 (abr. student ed., 1965).
" L. JAFFE, supra note 10, at 142.
12 Judicial recognition of the power of the CAB to immunize agreements from the operation
of the antitrust laws is exemplified in Putnam v. Air Transport Ass'n of America, 112 F. Supp.
885 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). For statutory authority under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, see
414, 72 Stat. 770 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1382 & 1384 (1964).
"United States Nay. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 50 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1931), aff'd, 284 U.S. 474
(1932); 342 U.S. 570.
14 50 F.2d at 91.
" S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transport Ass'n, 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
955 (1952).
1" Apgar Travel Agency v. International Air Transp. Ass'n, 107 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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Westbound 7 uses language that seems to circumscribe the use of the doc-
trine of primary jurisdiction. The defendant was an association of shipping
companies that increased its rates on items shipped by the plaintiff. After
five years of compliance with these rates, plaintiff brought an action for
treble damages under the Clayton Act because defendant had failed to
obtain approval of the rate schedule from the Federal Maritime Commis-
sion. The Supreme Court held that prior approval of an earlier agreement
could be interpreted as approval of the agreement in question; 8 therefore,
since the instant agreement was "arguably lawful," the plaintiff would
first be required to obtain a Board ruling on whether immunity had been
granted before the district court could decide the case. 9 The Court, in
dictum, indicated that, had the agreement been "clearly unlawful," the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction would not have applied, and the district
court could have heard the case."
The present court distinguished between antitrust suits in which an in-
junction is the requested relief, and the instant situation in which the
plaintiff seeks only monetary relief for injuries resulting from the illegal
agreement between Add and Pan American." Referring to S.S.W., Inc. v.
Air Transport Ass'n' and Apgar Travel Agency v. International Air
Transportation Ass'n" as cases exemplifying the usual result where in-
junction is a part of the relief requested, the court pointed out that since
an injunction would not be appropriate in the instant case, the usual result
need not be reached. Both S.S.W. and Apgar involved claims for injunction
and for treble damages, and the result was an application of the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction. Since there is no element of currency to Allied's
claim, the present court held, relying on the Carnation decision, that if
"plaintiff does not seek injunctive relief, we see no reason why the anti-
trust action should not proceed."' 4
The court also reasoned that the agreement between Add and Pan
American did not meet the "arguably lawful" distinction set out in
Carnation, thereby making resort to the CAB futile." Pan American urged
that the "arguably lawful" distinction was inoperative in the instant case
since it applies only to cases arising under the Federal Shipping Act-the
act under which the Carnation case arose-which differs essentially from
the Federal Aviation Act. Section 15 of the Federal Shipping Act reads,
in pertinent part, as follows:
1'383 U.S. 213 (1966).
"s In holding that the Commission is to determine whether it has granted immunity or has
withheld it, the Court holds contra to the decision by the Second Circuit that "When all that
remains is for the Court to say what plain words of the statute mean and whether the Board has
acted, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply." River Plate and Brazil Conference v.
Pressed Steel Car Co., 277 F.2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1955).
'9383 U.S. at 224.
'0. ... Therefore, the Far East and Cunard principles only preclude courts from awarding
treble damages when the defendants' conduct is arguably lawful under the Shipping Act." Id. at
222.
2' 393 F.2d at 446.
2 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
2" 107 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
24 393 F.2d at 448.
25 393 F.2d at 447.
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The Board may by order disapprove, cancel or modify any agreement, or any
modification or cancellation thereof, whether or not previously approved by
it, that it finds to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers,
shippers . . . or between exporters from the United States . . . and shall
approve all other agreements, modifications, or cancellations.
All agreements, modifications, or cancellations made after the organization
of the Board shall be lawful only when and as long as approved by the Board,
and before approval or after disapproval it shall be unlawful to carry out in
whole or in part, directly or indirectly, any such agreement, modification,
or cancellation [Emphasis added.]."
Carnation holds that this language prohibits retroactive validation of an
agreement by the Federal Maritime Commission. Thus, Section 15, in haec
verba, makes any agreement that is implemented prior to approval by the
Board "clearly unlawful" and thereby subject to the operation of the
antitrust laws.
In contrast are sections 412 and 414 of the Federal Aviation Act:
(b) The Board shall by order disapprove any such contract or agreement,
whether or not previously approved by it, that it finds to be the adverse to
the public interest, or in violation of this chapter, and shall by order approve
any such contract or agreement, or modification or cancellation thereof, that
it does not find to be adverse to the public interest, or in violation of this
chapter . . . [Emphasis added.]."
Any person affected by any order made under sections . . . 412 of this Act
shall be, and is hereby, relieved from the operations of the "antitrust laws,"
as designed in section 1 of the act . . . , and of all other restraints or prohibi-
tions made by, or imposed under, authority of law, insofar as may be neces-
sary to enable such person to do anything authorized, approved, or required
by such order [Emphasis added.].'
Section 412 clearly gives the CAB the power to approve an agreement even
though there was no attempt made by the parties operating under agree-
ment to obtain immunity from the antitrust laws." Pan American argued
that the CAB should be given an opportunity to approve the agreement
between Pan American and Add. Approval would immunize them from
operation of the antitrust laws and thereby defeat plaintiff's treble-damage
claim."
Even though Allied conceded that the CAB does have the power to
retroactively approve or disapprove existing agreements and immunize
past as well as future activities,"' the instant court stated:
26 Shipping Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 733 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. 5 814 (1964).
"
7Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 414, 72 Stat. 770 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1382
(1964).
28Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 414, 72 Stat. 770 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1384
(1964).
29 Cf., FMB v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
"0 The language of the statute refers to agreements already in effect, i.e., "The Board shall by
order disapprove any such contract or agreement . . . that it finds to be adverse to the public
interest . . . [Emphasis added.]."
" For cases holding that the CAB can immunize past activities, see Pan American World Air-
ways, Inc. v. U.S., 371 U.S. 296 (1963); 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951); 107 F. Supp. 706
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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[T]his case is distinguishable from those where the doctrine of primary juris-
diction has been applied to antitrust actions . . . because plaintiffs did not
seek injunctive relief and it is conceded that the alleged agreement is no
longer in effect."
The Carnation case therefore is still important to the determination of the
plaintiff's course of action in obtaining relief for the alleged conspiracy of
the defendants; if some previously filed agreement between Add and Pan
American could reasonably have extended immunity from the antitrust
laws to the active embargo of Allied's shipments, then the action was
"arguably lawful" and Carnation requires that the CAB rule to clarify
the status of the agreement. If the agreement is "clearly unlawful" be-
cause of the failure of Add and Pan American to obtain CAB approval,
then recourse to the CAB would be futile since the agency cannot retro-
actively approve an agreement that is no longer in effect.
Pan American also argued that narrowing the field of primary juris-
diction by excluding cases such as the instant one would hamper the
orderly administration of the regulatory scheme. Agreements could be
approved by the Board as being in the "public interest" under section 412
of the FAA" while similar agreements could be held in violation of anti-
trust laws simply because they are completed acts not exempted by agency
action. In rejecting this contention, the court pointed out that "this is
not a case where the past is a prologue to present problems." Stressing that
there was no need for uniformity in this instance the court cited Judge
Clark's statement: "[T]he outstanding feature of the doctrine is properly
said to be its flexibility permitting the courts to make a workable alloca-
tion of the business between themselves and the agencies. '
The Allied court also held that its decision in Maddock & Miller, Inc. v.
United States Lines' did not require a result different from that reached.
In Maddock the court referred all three counts of alleged misconduct to
the Federal Maritime Commission, even though two of the charges were
antitrust allegations which the court found would not require considera-
tion by the agency. The instant court reasoned:
Although we found that decision of the two antitrust counts by the district
court would not seem to interfere with the Commission's exercise of its
powers, the action was nonetheless stayed to permit the Commission to con-
sider in the first instance whether or not the agreement in question constituted
a rebate, in order to take advantage of the Commission's special ability to
handle this factual issue, common to all counts."7
Here, rules the court, "the Board has no special abilities which it could
bring to bear on the problems" to be resolved.
In ruling that Allied need not appear before the CAB, the instant court
32 393 F.2d at 446.
3"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 414, 72 Stat. 770 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S&C. § 1384
(1964).
'4393 F.2d at 448.
"CAB v. Modern Air Transport, 179 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1964).
a 365 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1966).
'¢393 F.2d at 448, 449.
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has presented an interesting tactical consideration for future plaintiffs fac-
ing hit and run acts of unfair competition. If any type of injunctive re-
lief is requested in addition to treble-damage for antitrust violation, then
S.S.W. and Apgar point to initial recourse to the CAB. Other cases affirm
that with the element of continuity implicit in the request for injunctive
relief, subsequent approval of a previously unfiled agreement will carry
immunization backward as well as forward, thereby giving the defendant
a defense of immunity in an unfair competition suit." If some prior act
of the CAB raises a question that immunity may already have been granted
by implication, then Carnation shows the desirability of initial recourse
to the CAB to resolve whether the "arguably lawful" agreement has in
fact been approved. The Maddock case and others 9 illustrate that the
technical complexities of the subject matter may result in the invocation
of the primary jurisdiction rule if a court feels it necessary to take ad-
vantage of the "special abilities" of a federal administrative agency."
But if the agreement has been terminated and the allegation is for money
damages only, then the instant decision permits the district court to hear
the case without invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
The second circuit in the present case circumscribes the use of the pri-
mary jurisdiction doctrine by requiring that there be an element of cur-
rency in the plaintiff's claim. This would seem to place the plaintiff in the
position of being able to evade the jurisdiction of the CAB by merely
delaying his action until the unfiled agreement is no longer in effect and
by limiting his claim to past damages, even though there may be "cur-
rency" involved. This situation is mentioned in Footnote 3 of the court's
opinion, which states:
While paragraphs 30 et seq. of plaintiffs' complaint alleged that defendant
had continued a course of conduct calculated to destroy plaintiffs' credit up
to the moment of filing of the complaint, on motion for rehearing before
Judge Palmieri plaintiffs announced that they would amend their complaint
to delete these paragraphs and limit themselves to causes of action based upon
the agreement between Pan American and Add Airfreight which allegedly
had terminated. Plaintiffs may amend the complaint without leave pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P.15 (a). Therefore, we assume that Allied will so amend
its complaint and that the amended complaint will relate exclusively to
transaction and occurrences which terminated prior to the time that the
complaint was filed.'
Depending upon whether a plaintiff complains only of past injury or also
alleges current harm, inconsistent regulation of the practices and dealings
of air carriers will result. It is entirely conceivable that the CAB could
approve as in the public interest, an agreement between air carriers which,
if the plaintiff only requested damages for past injuries, might be the basis
for a district court judgment for treble-damages. However, this possibility
"
8 McManus v. CAB, 286 F.2d 414 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 928 (1961); McManus v.
Lake Central Airlines, Inc., 327 F.2d 212 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964).
"
9 See also, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); 356 U.S. 481 (1958); L. JAFFI, supra note 10, at 133.
40 393 F.2d at 448, 449.
41 Id. at 446.
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is perhaps more speculative than realistic. What the present case effectively
does is pose a warning to those who make agreements in restraint of trade
without obtaining immunization from the appropriate regulatory agency.
Failure to obtain agency approval gives the plaintiff the power to invoke
the severe penalties of the antitrust laws by basing his claim on past acts,
thereby barring the subsequent immunization by the agency as a saving
device for the defendant.
K. Mark Pistorius
Default Judgment - Collateral Attack
Laches As A Defense
In June 1962, a Pennsylvania resident was killed in the crash of a pri-
vate plane manufactured by the defendant, a Texas corporation. Dece-
dent's administrator brought suit against the corporation in a United
States district court in Pennsylvania for negligence and breach of warran-
ty. Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship;' and service
of process on the defendant was sought under Federal Rule 4(d) (7),'
which permits service "in the manner prescribed by the law of the state
in which the district court is held." Initially plaintiff attempted personal
service on a Pennsylvania distributor of aircraft manufactured by the de-
fendant;3 subsequently he made substituted service on the Secretary of the
Commonwealth under the state "long-arm" statute.4 Upon defendant's
failure to appear, the federal district court in Pennsylvania rendered de-
fault judgment for the plaintiff who thereafter sought to register the
judgment' in a federal district court in Texas. Asserting that the district
court in Pennsylvania had not acquired in personam jurisdiction, defend-
ant filed a Motion to Quash Registration and to Quash Execution. The
federal court in Texas denied the motion and the defendant appealed.
Held, reversed: When service of process is defective, a court does not ac-
quire in personam jurisdiction; any judgment rendered by the court is void
and subject to attack; and a defendant's failure to attack the judgment in
that court does not operate, under a doctrine of laches, as an estoppel
which prevents the defendant from asserting a lack of jurisdiction in a
later action on the judgment. Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. Donnelly, 402 F.2d
400 (5th Cir. 1968).
Because federal "subject matter" jurisdiction rests in part on "diversity
of citizenship,"' how one goes about acquiring valid in personam juris-
diction over a "non-resident" corporation looms as a problem of consid-
erable consequence in federal suits. In order to acquire the requisite juris-
diction, process must be served utilizing either the procedure outlined in
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or state process as provided
in Rule 4(d) (7) . So long as the local rule incorporated under Rule
4(d) (7) conforms to the constitutional requirements of due process, and
complies with the general requirement of actual notice to a "party not an
inhabitant of or found within the state" as set forth in Rule 4 (e),' the
'28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
'FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d) (7).
'PENNA. R. CIV. P. 2180(a).
4§ 1011B, PENNA. Bus. CORP. LAW OF 1933, as amended, 15 PENNA. STAT. ANN. § 2852-
1011B, (Purdon 1967).
'28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1964).
628 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
7
FED. R. Cnm. P. 4(d)(1) through (7).
8 FEn. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
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local procedure can be utilized to acquire valid jurisdiction over both resi-
dent and non-resident defendants.
Consistent with procedural due process, a court may acquire in per-
sonam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when the corporation has
sufficient "contacts" with the forum state.! Announcing its decision in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington," the Supreme Court held that due
process "requires only that in order to subject a defendant to judgment
in personam [Court's italics.], if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the main-
tenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice [Emphasis added.]."" Under this rule, a single act might
be sufficient to permit valid service if the two basic requirements are met:
(1) There must be "minimum contacts" between the forum state and the
corporation; and (2) subjecting the corporation to the state's jurisdiction
must meet the test of "fair play and substantial justice." It should be
noted that the "contacts" required are between the corporation and the
state, not merely between the subject matter of the activity in question and
the state." Since the decision in International Shoe, the reach of state ju-
dicial processes has been extended through state "long-arm" statutes which
codify the "minimum contacts" rule."
It takes only a mildly overworked imagination to see that, because of
the possibilities of extending a state's jurisdiction outside its boundaries
under a long-arm statute, non-resident corporations often will attempt to
show that the courts purporting to enter judgment against them did not
have the requisite jurisdiction. A valid money judgment can only be ren-
dered when the court has properly acquired jurisdiction over the defend-
ant."' If it does not have such jurisdiction, its judgment is void." Theoret-
ically, the judgment never existed; it is a legal nullity and, therefore, has
no legal force. The defendant may thereafter attack the judgment on jur-
isdictional grounds without regard to the merits of the plaintiff's claim.
A void judgment can be attacked in one of several ways. In the strict
sense, attack on the jurisdiction of a court after a judgment has become res
judicata is a collateral attack.'7 But because there are different criteria for
the types of attack, different terminology is used in referring to them. A
"direct" attack is made by motion in the court which entered the judg-
ment." It may be collateral in the sense that it is an attack on the under-
lying jurisdiction of the court, but it is considered direct because of the
court where it is made. For reasons which will be discussed below, the
'International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
10 Id.
lid. at 316.
"F. JAMES, CIVL PROCEDURE, § 12.8 (1965).
'a See, e.g.: § 210 et seq. N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW, as amended, N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS (McKinney
1943); 15 PENNA STAT. ANN. § 2011 (Purdon 1967); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2031, 2031a, &
2031b, (Vernon 1926).
'
4 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
"'Id. See also Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1944) and McDonald v. Mabee,
243 U.S. 90 (1917).
1" Id.
"See JAMES, supra note 12, at § 11.5-11.6.
'8 Id.
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direct attack is considered an "offensive" tactic. What is commonly labeled
a "collateral" attack is made in a court other than the one in which judg-
ment was rendered. 9 It may be classified either as "offensive," when the
defendant seeks a declaratory judgment that the original judgment is void,
or "defensive," when the defendant sets up voidness as a defense in an
action on the judgment.
In the federal courts, "direct" attack against a judgment which cannot
be appealed-either because the time for appeal has elapsed or because the
judgment has been affirmed on appeal-is permitted under Federal Rule
60 (b)."° It is recognized that even when the judgment has become final,
the defendant may still petition the court which rendered the judgment to
rescind it because of the lack of jurisdiction. 1 Such an attack must be
brought within a reasonable time.2 It is generally held that the lapse of an
unreasonable amount of time, especially in the case of a default judgment,
can act as a bar to the attack."3
In a direct attack the party asserting lack of jurisdiction does so in an
affirmative way; he initiates the attack either by bringing an appeal or by
petitioning that the judgment be set aside. But the so-called "collateral
attack," which is made in a court other than the one in which the judg-
ment was rendered, can be (and often is) used as a defense to an action
on the judgment brought by the winning plaintiff. Especially in a case in
which the parties are residents of different states, the plaintiff who has been
awarded judgment seeks to have it enforced in another action (normally
in the state where the non-resident defendant has property on which exe-
cution can be levied). In this second action the defendant sets up as a de-
fense the voidness of the first judgment in attacking the first court's juris-
diction.
This distinction between the offensive and defensive use of attack can
become especially important. As noted, the direct attack, under, for ex-
ample, Federal Rule 60 (b),", must be brought within a reasonable time or
the defendant will be estopped by his own inaction from asserting the
voidness of the judgment." But in the case of a defensive attack, since the
defendant does nothing, since he merely awaits action by the plaintiff, he
may attack whenever the plaintiff brings his action on the judgment. An
estoppel cannot be worked on the defendant merely because he failed to
act, for it is up to the plaintiff to initiate the execution of the judgment.
The consequences of applying a rule of laches in the case of a defensive at-
tack can well be imagined. Under such a rule there would be a point at
which it would be "unreasonable" to attack the judgment and the defend-
19 id.
20 FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). It should be noted that 60(b) concerns only personal and not sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.
2' See JAMES, supra note 12, at § 11.5-11.6.
2id.
23 Id.
24 FED. R. Civ. P. 60 (b).
" Id. Rule 60(b) reads, in pertinent part: "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment . . . for the following reasons: (1) ..
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not
more than one year after the judgment . . . was entered . . . [Emphasis added.]."
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ant would be estopped from raising the defense of lack of jurisdiction in
the original forum. The plaintiff, then, would merely wait until that point
had been reached before he initiated his action on the judgment. When the
defendant pleaded the defense of voidness, the plaintiff could defeat the
plea by showing that a reasonable time had passed. Such a rule would
require the defendant to come into court in the first forum, and this is
clearly contrary to the generally accepted notion that a defendant can re-
frain from appearing if he is willing to suffer the consequences or is cer-
tain that the plaintiff cannot get a valid judgment.
A recent Pennsylvania case has recognized the general rules just men-
tioned. Myers v. Mooney Aircraft' was the combination on appeal of two
cases arising out of the same incident (the other being Wilhere v. Mooney
Aircraft). Because of the similarity between these cases and Mooney Air-
craft v. Donnelly,2' a third action based on the same facts, it is important
that Myers be discussed in some detail. An airplane manufactured by de-
fendant Mooney Aircraft, a Texas corporation, had crashed killing the
pilot, the owner of the plane, and a passenger, all of whom were Penn-
sylvania residents. The respective plaintiffs, personal representatives of the
pilot and the passenger, brought suit in Pennsylvania state courts. De-
fendant failed to appear or answer in either case. In Wilhere the defendant
filed a motion in the trial court, over two and a half years after the suit
was initiated, to "strike off" the default judgment which had been ren-
dered against it. The motion was denied and Mooney appealed. At the
same time, Mooney filed a "preliminary objection" in the second case, the
Myers suit, alleging a lack of in personam jurisdiction. When this motion
was overruled, Mooney again appealed. The appeals were consolidated in
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
In each case service of process was attempted under Pennsylvania rules
of procedure. Both plaintiffs attempted service under the rule permitting
service on a corporation's agent within the state. 8 In Myers substituted
service was also attempted under the state long-arm statute." As to the
substituted service, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that Mooney
was "doing business" within the state under the terms of the statute."
But Mooney was able to demonstrate in both Myers and Wilhere that the
supposed agent served with process was an independent contractor who
bought aircraft from Mooney and thereafter sold them to his own custo-
mers. Since the distributor was not an agent, Mooney was not constructive-
ly within the state, and service under the rule was ineffective for acquir-
ing personal jurisdiction. Service in Myers, then, was held to be valid on the
basis of the long-arm statute, thus giving the trial court jurisdiction. But
because of the defect in service in Wilhere, it would appear that the de-
fault judgment had to be reversed. Nevertheless the court affirmed the
26429 Pa. 177, 240 A.2d 505 (1967).
27402 F.2d 400 (1968).
28 PENNA. R. Civ. P. 2180(a).
29§ 1011B, PENNA. Bus. CORP. LAW OF 1933, as amended, 15 PENNA. STAT. ANN. S 2852-
1011B, (Purdon 1967).
20Myers v. Mooney Aircraft, 240 A.2d at 509.
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judgment, holding that, although Pennsylvania had not acquired in per-
sonam jurisdiction because of the defect in service, the defendant none-
theless could not attack the judgment. "[W]hatever rights [the defend-
ant] might have had to attack this judgment have been lost by its own
carelessness and the passage of time."3 The court applied the doctrine of
laches, recognizing the general rule in the case of offensive attack, that the
defendant will be estopped by his own apparent inaction. The defendant
could not be heard to deny that the trial court lacked jurisdiction.
Several major points distinguish the Donnelly case from Wilhere and
Myers even though the cases arose from the same incident and had some
procedural similarities. Indeed, from a procedural viewpoint the underlying
incident is immaterial. Donnelly was brought in a federal district court in
Pennsylvania whereas Myers and Wilhere were in the state courts. Service
in Donnelly was attempted under the same rules utilized in Myers, pursuant
to Federal Rule 4(d) (7)," except that service under the long-arm statute
in Donnelly was made before the amendments applicable in Myers had
gone into effect.33 Default judgment was rendered in Pennsylvania, but
then the plaintiff took his judgment to Texas for registration in federal
district court. Mooney, therefore, made a defensive attack on jurisdiction
in Texas rather than an offensive one in Pennsylvania.
On appeal from the denial of Mooney's motion to quash the registration
for want of jurisdiction, the plaintiff contended that under the Erie doc-
trine the federal courts were bound by the opinion of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Myers. That is, the federal courts must look to the hold-
ing in Myers for a proper interpretation of the Pennsylvania rules of pro-
cedure. The Court of Appeals analyzed the Myers decision at some length
and with considerable care inasmuch as its analysis was "founded upon the
* * .statutes as interpreted by the Pennsylvania opinion."'" Service under
the long-arm statute had been found to be invalid by the Texas district
court. The statute applicable in Myers, by which Pennsylvania had acquired
jurisdiction in that case, was not in force when service was attempted in
Donnelly."' Therefore, the holding in Myers that Pennsylvania had ac-
quired jurisdiction under its long-arm statute was of no relevance. Relying
on another Pennsylvania opinion which had interpreted the earlier statute,6
the Texas district court found that Mooney's actions did not fall within
the scope of the statute and Pennsylvania had not acquired jurisdiction.
This portion of the district court opinion was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. On the question of service on Mooney's putative agent, it reversed
"FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (7).3FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (d) (7).
"Prior to 13 Aug. 1963, § I011B, PENNA. BUS. CORP. LAW OF 1933, as amended, 15 PENNA.
STAT. ANN. § 2852-1011B, (Purdon 1967), provided for service of process "in any action arising
out of acts or omissions of such corporations within [Pennsylvania] [Emphasis added.]." In both
Wilhere and Donnelly service was made under the statute as it read before 13 Aug. 1963. After
that date the italicized language in the above quotation was amended to read "in any action
arising within [Pennsylvania]." Service was made in Myers after 13 Aug. 1963 under the statute
as amended.
'4 402 F.2d at 402.
sId. at 402-3.
" Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 405 Pa. 12, 173 A,2d 123 (1961).
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the lower court. Even though the Mooney distributor served in Donnelly
was not the same as that served in Myers, the Court of Appeals found that
the two had substantially the same relationship with the defendant. Since
the "agent" served in Donnelly was in reality an independent contractor,
under the interpretation rendered in Myers the attempted service was de-
fective.
Had it not been for the plaintiff's insistence that the federal courts
were bound by the entire Myers decision, it would have been an easy mat-
ter for the court to hold that because both attempts at service were in-
effective the judgment was void. The Court of Appeals refused, however,
to follow the Pennsylvania court's view of laches. Rather it stressed that
"no authority ... demands that we regulate our court appearances ... by
means of sanctions utilized in Pennsylvania,"" even though it had "ac-
cept[ed] the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's analysis of the state's long-arm
statute by authority of Federal Rule 4 (d) (7) ." Because of the holding in
Hanna v. Plumer,0 the court found that it was not required to follow a
strict "outcome determination" test.'0 As to the laches argument itself the
court said:
If we were to accept the administrator's argument here, we would deny
Mooney's right to remain silent and would make a mockery of jurisdictional
safeguards .... Inaction as a response to non-authorized action cannot render
such action valid. The doctrine of laches has never been jurisdiction creating
[Emphasis added.].4
It then concluded its opinion by stating:
[We are not convinced] that Mooney, by risking default judgment, should
lose its legal rights. Our role is not to reward legal courage or to penalize legal
cowardice.42
While undoubtedly correct in its conclusion, it appears that the Court of
Appeals missed the point of the Donnelly case. In rejecting the laches argu-
ment, the distinction between direct and collateral attack, between offen-
sive and defensive use of attack, is not mentioned in the opinion." To be
37402 F.2d at 406.
38 Id.
20380 U.S. 460 (1965).
40 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282
F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960) announced a decision which would seem to be contrary to the "outcome
determination" test of Guaranty Trust in allowing a federal court to decide matters of state pro-
cedure for itself. However, barely three years later the same court seemed to overrule its Jaftex
decision in Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963, en banc) wherein it
held that the federal court must apply state standards for determining the validity of Rule 4(d) (7)
service. The problem has been compounded by the decisions in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric
Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) (holding that a federal court is not necessarily bound
automatically by the "outcome determination" test) and in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)
(holding that the Erie rule cannot void application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
4'402 F.2d at 406.
41 Id. at 407.
41 In 402 F.2d at 407 the Donnelly court cites Williams v. Capital Transit Co., 215 F.2d 487
(D.C. Cir. 1954) to the effect that "No lapse of time can serve the plaintiff. The lack of jurisdic-
tion of the court cannot be cured by the running of months or even years where the court had
no jurisdiction . . . in the first place [Court's emphasis.]." The Williams case involves a direct
attack made three years after purported service. It would seem that by the quoted language the
Williams and Donnelly courts both take the view that laches cannot act to bar attack under any
and all circumstances. A further reading of the Williams opinion, however, indicates that the
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sure at one point there is some skirting of the distinction when it is noted
that the holding in Myers rendered
Mooney subject to the jurisdiction of the Pennslyvania courts because of its
improper entrance into the state proceedings. To the contrary, Mooney's
method of challenging the federal proceedings was beyond question. Mooney
made no entrance during the extent of litigation in Pennsylvania and entered
in due course when the locus of action moved to Texas."'
But there is no further mention of the essentially different procedural sit-
uations involved in Myers and Donnelly. Aside from a rather superficial at-
titude towards the "outcome determination" doctrine,4 the opinion fails to
recognize that while laches can be "jurisdiction creating" in the case of
direct attack, the instant case was not such an attack. It was, instead, a
defensive "collateral" attack, the rules of which differ from those for
direct attacks. Mooney had a "right to remain silent" only because of the
nature of the action. In a certain sense, Mooney gambled that Pennsyl-
vania had not acquired jurisdiction. Since prosecution of all affirmative
acts is up to the aggrieved party, Mooney could continue to gamble, could
continue to ignore the Pennsylvania action, until the plaintiff sought reg-
istration. At that point, if the Pennsylvania court lacked personal juris-
diction, Mooney could have avoided the judgment no matter how long the
plaintiff had waited.
Although the court's analysis can be criticized, Mooney Aircraft v.
Donnelly is a case of no little significance. In reaching the result it did, the
opinion serves to dispel any doubt which could still be entertained that a
defendant may gamble in the procedural dice game. The value of this de-
cision rests, if not on its legal precision, on the holding that a lapse of time
will not prejudice the defendant in a defensive attack on a void judgment.
Bruce L. Ashton
court there merely found no prejudice in allowing the attack. Since avoiding a judgment in a direct
attack is an equitable remedy, the Williams case represents nothing more than the exercise of the
court's discretion in granting the remedy.
44 402 F.2d at 406.
4 The Supreme Court, in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), first announced
the "outcome determination" test when it held that a federal court under the Erie doctrine was
required to follow the state rule, regardless of whether it could be classed as substantive or pro-
cedural, in order to reach the same result in both courts. In a strict sense, then, under this test
and the general Erie doctrine, the court here should have been concerned with how a Texas state
court would have viewed the problem of enforcing the default judgment against Mooney and not-
at least at the outset-with what the Pennsylvania state courts had done. That is, the federal dis-
trict court in Texas, under the Erie doctrine, is obliged to follow the rules of Texas state courts.
Only if the Texas state courts would follow the Pennsylvania decision would the federal courts
in Texas be concerned with it. As indicated in n. 40, supra, however, even granting this theoretical
approach, the question may be moot.
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Collateral Estoppel - Choice of Laws - A New Approach
to Multi-Passenger Accident Litigation
As a consequence of the adversary system as well as of the traditional
Anglo-American view of the role of the judiciary and the limited func-
tion of appellate courts, the initiative for new developments in the law rests
with attorneys. It is true that modern procedural law has abandoned the
so-called sporting theory of justice and the courts have repeatedly de-
clared that a lawsuit should not just be a "battle of wits between the
attorneys"' and that the outcome should not depend on the observance
of procedural niceties. Nevertheless, the initiative for the development of
the law-apart from legislative action-is left largely to the ingenuity
and creative imagination of attorneys in their attempts to convince the
courts to apply legal doctrines and general principles to situations which
were not contemplated in the case from which original doctrines and
principles are derived. In order to achieve the best result for his client,
it is sometimes the duty of an attorney to try new approaches and to
attempt to persuade a court to adopt new theories for the solution of the
controversy.
Recently this creative legal thinking produced an attempt to combine
the two modern doctrines of collateral estoppel and the most significant
relationship test for choice of laws in tort cases, in order to bring a quick
adjudication within minimum efforts and assure a more favorable choice
of law rule to the plaintiffs, the heirs of a plane crash victim.' By offen-
sively pleading the decision of a Texas federal court between a different
plaintiff against the same defendant involving the same fact issue, the
attorneys tried to establish, in a new action brought in a New York state
court, the defendant's liability for a plane crash which occurred in Ken-
tucky. However, the judge of the special term of the Supreme Court of
New York refused to accept the plaintiffs' view because he felt it would
be presumptious to enter into "hitherto unexplored territory."' In denying
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment based on the theory that the
Texas judgment had established the liability of the airline company for
the new action in New York, the judge passed the responsibility for the
decision to the regular term of the Supreme Court.
In order to appreciate the full sweep of the plaintiffs' plea, this note
will (1) discuss the development of the two doctrines, (2) examine the
application of the two doctrines in this New York case, and (3) consider
the possibilities of conjunctive use of the two doctrines in the future.
'Guilford National Bank v. Southern Railway, 297 F.2d 921, 924 (4th Cir. 1962).
2Hart v. American Airlines, 10 Av. Cas. 17,894 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 297 N.Y.S.2d 587
(1969).
'Id. at 17,896.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
I. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Collateral estoppel is a segment of that area of law called res judicata.
Res judicata in its broad sense asserts that once an action is tried to a final
judgment, that judgment affects subsequent litigation brought on the
same issues or facts and later actions on the judgment.' Within this
large area falls collateral estoppel which operates only on the fact issues'
and should be distinguished from res judicata in its narrow sense which
operates as bar and merger on the same cause of action between the same
parties.! The traditional rule of collateral estoppel is that once the fact
issues have been litigated to a conclusion, the issues as between the parties
to the prior suit are closed and cannot be relitigated in a later action. Thus,
collateral estoppel operates even in later actions involving causes of action
different from that in the first suit; the doctrine prevents the relitigation
of issues already decided. The purpose of the doctrine is to secure the
finality of litigated fact issues and thus economy of judicial effort.'
Generally the requirement of mutuality is necessary for the collateral
estoppel doctrine to be exercised. Mutuality restricts the utilization of a
prior court determination in a subsequent suit to those who were parties
to the prior suit or those in privity with them.8 Although in most juris-
dictions the doctrine is still a requisite for the use of collateral estoppel,'
a growing minority of states have denounced the mutuality requirement
as outmoded and not in the best interests of justice.0 In recent years the
trend has been to increase the persons who may avail themselves of the
doctrine.1
For the most part, the retreat from the requisite of mutuality results
from discontent with the rigidity of the rule. 2 The 1942 Restatement of
Judgments had recognized exceptions to the general rule."3 This discontent
was openly revealed in 1942 by the Bernhard v. Bank of America"4 decision
of the California Supreme Court. Justice Traynor in Bernhard stated that
mutuality is not a prerequisite for collateral estoppel to operate. That
court applied collateral estoppel without its mutuality element in a de-
fensive use and did not identify, distinguish, or mention the differences
between its possible offensive and defensive uses. The Bernhard decision
'RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 45(c) (1942); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351
(1876); see generally F. JAMES, CrIVL PROCEDURE § 11.9 (1965).
5Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597-98 (1948).
6 JAMES, supra note 4, at § 11.9.
'34 J. AIR L. & CoM. 304 (1968).JAMES, supra note 4, at § 11.31.
Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CAL. L. REV. 25, 27 (1965).
'9DeWitt v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 225 N.E.2d 195 (1967); Lustik v.
Rankila, 269 Minn. 515, 131 N.W.2d 741 (1964); Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249,
72 N.W.2d 364, 54 A.L.R.2d 316 (1955); DePolo v. Greig, 338 Mich. 703, 62 N.W.2d 441
(1954); Cantrell v. Burnett & Henderson Co., 187 Tenn. 552, 216 S.W.2d 307 (1948); Bernhard
v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942); Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi Cola Co., 6
W.W.Harr. 134, 36 Del. 124, 172 A. 260 (1932).
11 JAMES, supra note 4, at § 11.32.
12Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 862-65 (1952). See also
JAMES, supra note 4, at § 11.34.
"8 Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Non
Party, 35 Guo. WASH. L. REV. 1010, 1015 (1967).
14 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
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was not followed even in California until a number of years later." But
recently the defensive use of the collateral estoppel doctrine without the
mutuality requirement has been extended to the point of being a significant
minority rule. 6 Even more recently the offensive use of the doctrine has
been accepted in some jurisdictions' although questioned by others. The
offensive use of the doctrine has been criticized on the basis that it creates
more problems than its solves." For instance, prospective plaintiffs might
be reluctant to join the first suit of a multi-passenger accident litigation"'
since they might find themselves bound by findings of fact in a suit in
which they did not fully participate. If the plaintiffs in the first suit won,
then the subsequent plaintiffs could naturally use the judgment for settle-
ment purposes. More important, the offensive use of the doctrine would
allow them to establish the facts in accordance with the findings in the
first judgment. Also a problem arises if in a suit, a judgment is rendered
in a close decision for a small award. Because the award is small, the de-
fendant satisfies the judgment rather than appeal. Later, a subsequent
plaintiff files suit against defendant and moves for summary judgment on
the basis of the prior adjudication. However, the claimant in the subse-
quent suit is praying for a tremendous award compared to the prior suit.
Would the granting of the motion be violative of due process or against
public policy?
Most recently the New York Court of Appeals has brought that state
into the increasing number of states applying the new doctrine with its
1967 decision in DeWitt v. Hall. The action arose as a result of a collision
between defendant Hall and a truck driver employee of DeWitt, Inc.,
owner of the truck. In the first suit against Hall the driver-employee re-
covered for personal injuries; then, two months later, suit was brought
by DeWitt against the same defendant for the property damage to the
truck. Motion for summary judgment against Hall was made on the basis
of collateral estoppel, and was ultimately granted. The court in DeWitt
went even further than other jurisdictions which have adopted the non-
mutuality collateral concept by specifically accepting the offensive use of
the doctrine: There is "no reason in policy or precedent to prevent the
'offensive' use of a prior judgment by a non-party."" As a result of this
1967 decision, New York is now theoretically willing to permit offensive
use of findings of fact previously litigated in subsequent suit where only
one party to the subsequent suit also participated in the earlier action.
"5 Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV.
281 (1957).
16 Supra note 9.
'"Notably New York, DeWitt v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 225 N.E.2d 195
(1967); and Wisconsin, McCourt v. Algiers, 4 Wis. 2d 607, 91 N.W.2d 194 (1958).
"Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J. Super. Ct. 560, 213 A.2d 26 (1965); Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161
Cal. App. 2d 762, 327 P.2d 111 (1958). See also Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive
Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Non Party, supra note 13, at 1036.
'
5 Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J. Super. Ct. 560, 571-72, 213 A.2d at 32.
019 N.Y.2d 141, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 225 N.E.2d 195 (1967).
1 1Id. at 143, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 597, 225 N.E. at 196.
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II. CHOICE OF LAWS IN TORT ACTIONS
The time honored theory on choice of law in tort actions in the United
States has been lex loci delicti, the law of the place of the tort." This was
the doctrine accepted in the first Restatement.23 But like most rules, this
area of law has also gone through change largely because the problems of
modern day society have not been fairly solved by rigid concepts. Lex loci
promoted a uniform application of a single law in all jurisdictions, but it
was often not flexible enough to do justice in individual cases. For this
reason exceptions to the rule were developed and accepted. 4 But even de-
veloping numerous exceptions to a general rule did not offer the funda-
mental fairness which the more progressive courts were requiring.
New York once again played a major role in the demise of an unsatis-
factory legal concept. After first engrafting exceptions to the lex loci
doctrine, the New York courts finally began to develop a new concept.
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines' was the first case in which the New York
Court of Appeals revealed the changing philosophy. Therein the court
approached the choice of law problem in a surprising manner, reaching
its result by what later would be known as the most significant relation-
ship test. The suit resulted from an airplane crash at Nantucket, Massachu-
setts, on a flight from New York. The court used the Massachusetts statute
for the issue of liability but used New York law for the damages issue.
To reach this result, the issue of damages was declared to be procedural
in order to evade the Massachusetts maximum damages statute for wrongful
death.' Yet, the court apparently did not want to go so far as to apply
the New York wrongful death statute because it would frustrate the plain-
tiffs, as the statute had no provision for out-of-state application. In Pear-
son v. Northeast Airlines,27 a suit in federal court arising out of the same
accident, the Second Circuit decided that the procedure employed in
Kilberg was not a violation of the full faith and credit clause of the United
States Constitution. Finally, in 1963, in Babcock v. Jackson,2 a case in-
volving an Ontario guest-rider statute, New York broke with the indirect
approaches and determined that since New York had more interest in the
issues than the jurisdiction of the place of the tort, New York law should
govern. The Court of Appeals stated that "where the issue involves stand-
ards of conduct, it is more than likely that it is the law of the place of
the tort which will be controlling, but the disposition of other issues must
turn, as does the issue of the standard of conduct itself, on the law of
2 R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS OF LAW, § 132 (Revised ed. 1968).
2' RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 384 (1934).
24 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961); Emery v. Emery,
45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
259 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961).
26 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (1955); however, since this case the maximum recovery
has been raised.
"
7 Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912
(1963).
2 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I.
29 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
[Vol. 3 5
CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
the jurisdiction which has the strongest interest in the resolution of the
particular issue presented [Emphasis added.]."se
Babcock climaxes the the evolution of the most significant relationship
of governmental interest test in the choice of laws in tort actions. This
new theory on choice of laws in torts is now largely made up of many
concepts which have different names but which are basically the same."1
While the shift to these choice of laws rules has been slow, once again
California"2 and New York' are taking the lead in the move. A stimulus
to the shift was added when the second Restatement of Conflicts of Laws
adopted the most significant relationship test.' The Restatement now sets
out guidelines for determining what contacts are significant."
This new doctrine gives the courts more flexibility in order to deal with
issues fairly and still keep some uniformity. Basically, the courts will de-
termine which jurisdiction has the most significant contact with the issues
of the litigation and will apply the law of that jurisdiction. This procedure
does not limit the court to applying the law of the place of the tort or
that of the forum. The court considering all the factors may very well find
a third state to have the paramount interest and apply that state's law.
III. COMBINING THE Two DOCTRINES
Since, as we have seen, New York has recently adopted modern theories
of both collateral estoppel and choice of laws, it was only a matter of
time before an attempt was made to use the two conjunctively to produce
the result the attorneys were seeking.
In 1968 such an attempt was made in Hart v. American Airlines."5
The litigation was a result of an airline crash at the Cincinnati, Ohio, air-
port which is located across the Ohio River in Kentucky. In the first suit
tried to a conclusion, the defendant, American Airlines, was held liable
for negligence." The court rendering that judgment was a federal district
court in Texas which strictly adheres to lex loci delicti" as well as the
doctrine of mutuality in collateral estoppel.' Aware of the modern legal
301d. at 484, 191 N.E.2d at 285.
31 See generally, LEFLAR, supra note 22, at 97.
"2Reich v. Purcell, 63 Cal. Rep. 31, 432 P.2d 727 (1967).
33Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792 (1965).3
4 Infra note 35.
"2 "(1) The local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the occurrence
and with the parties determines their rights and liabilities in tort.
(2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in determining the state of most sig-
nificant relationship include:
(a) The place where the injury occurred,
(b) The place where the conduct occurred,
(c) The domicile, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties,
and,
(d) The place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
(3) In determining the relative importance of the character of the contacts, the forum will
consider the issues, the character of the tort, and the relevant purposes of the tort rules of the
interested states." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1964).
36 10 Av. Cas. 17,894 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 297 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1969).
"
7 Creasy v. American Airlines, CA3-1680 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 1968).
" Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182 (1968).
"
5 Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Southern Lumber Co., 145 Tex. 151, 196 S.W.2d 387 (1946);
Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871 (1964).
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attitudes that New York has toward collateral estoppel and choice of
laws in tort actions, the plaintiffs in Hart filed suit in New York even
though the decedents' domiciles had been in New Jersey and Connecticut.
Its principal place of business being New York, defendant American was
subjected to service of process in that state. At the proper time, plaintiffs
moved for summary judgment upon the issue of defendant's liability on
the basis of the findings of fact in the prior Texas litigation.
Since the court accepted the case,"0 New York procedural law applied
to the litigation. Through the doctrine of DeWitt the court could in this
suit allow the plaintiffs' attorneys the offensive use of another court's
findings in order to establish fact issues. By applying New York's offensive
collateral estoppel rule to the previously litigated issue of American Air-
lines' negligence, plaintiffs would eliminate the bulk of the litigation and
eliminate the necessity of retrying this issue.
However, because the prior litigation was in a federal court in Texas,
the problem of full faith and credit to the prior judgment might arise.
New York must give full faith and credit to a sister state's judgmen 1
or judgments of federal courts, but the nature and extent of the judgment
is measured by the usage of the state rendering the judgment.' Hence,
"a litigation once pursued to judgment shall be conclusive of the rights of
the parties in every other court as in that [state] where the judgment was
rendered."'  Texas' usage of collateral estoppel is limited strictly by the
mutuality doctrine. ' The full faith and credit clause requires the second
state to give at least as much weight to the judgment as the rendering state
gave.' Therefore, New York must give at least the extent of effectiveness
that Texas gives the judgment. But can it use the Texas judgment for the
benefit of a non-party while Texas maintains a strict mutuality require-
ment? The question, then, is whether the Texas judgment could be given
greater effect in one state than it would have been given in Texas.
While the U.S. Supreme Court cases show that the judgment must give
at least as much effect in the second court as was given in the rendering
court, the decisions have not stated specifically whether more effect can be
given to the judgment. The Supreme Court in Durfee v. Duke"7 seems to
suggest the possibility of giving greater weight to a judgment than the
rendering court attached. "Full faith and credit . . . generally requires
every state to give to a prior judgment at least the res judicata effect which
" Since the plaintiffs were non-domicilaries, they had to face the possibility that the court
might refuse to take jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Forum non con-
veniens simply gives the court the authority to refuse jurisdiction in a case even though the
venue is correct if in "the interest of justice" the suit should be brought in another forum.
LEFLAR, supra note 22, at S 53. The court in Hart made no mention of this issue so it should
be assumed that the court recognized a sufficient relation to the state of New York.
41 U.S. CoNSr. art. IV, § 1.
4 Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
4328 U.S.C. 1738; Kloeb v. Armour & Co., 311 U.S. 199 (1940).44 Magnolia Petroleum v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943); see also Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S.
545, 548 (1946).
4Supra note 38.4




the judgment would be accorded in the state which rendered it." In
some state court decisions the question has been answered in the affirmative;
that is, a court can give greater effect to another court's decision." In
the situation in Hart the court could probably give more weight to the
judgment than Texas does.
Assuming that the attorneys could effectively use the Texas judgment
in New York in a way in which it could not be used in Texas, the last
barrier to the attorneys' maneuver was establishing New York as the state
with the paramount interest in the issues, so that New York will be applied.
Since New York follows the most significant relationship or governmental
interest test, all the attorneys needed to accomplish was to persuade the
court that the case contained enough points of contact with New York so as
to justify that state's governmental interest. Even though the plaintiffs were
domiciliaries of New Jersey and Connecticut, it could reasonably be argued
that domicile was not as strong a factor in New York as in other states.
In New York City many of the businessmen and employees commute
from New Jersey or Connecticut. The single most determinative factor to
plaintiffs can be that the decedents had been permanently and gainfully
employed in the state. Other factors justifying New York's governmental
interests were also presented: The decedents contracted in New York for
transportation to Cincinnati and back to New York, the decedents boarded
the ill-fated airplane in New York, and the defendant had its principal
place of business in New York. This should be sufficient to create New
York's "predominant interest in the protection and regulation of the rights
of the persons involved""° in order to compel the court to rule that the
New York law should apply.
The judge at Special Term, however, declined to grant the motion for
summary judgment and declined ". . . an invitation, on a purely ad boc
adventure, to leave behind the most recent and most advanced landmark
decisions in New York on 'choice of laws in conflict' and 'collateral estop-
pel'."' The complicated legal issues involved apparently confused the
judge. He wished to follow the cautious path and defer the acceptance of
the combined application of the two doctrines. He avoided decision in
the case involving the non-domiciliary plaintiff and non-domiciliary de-
pendent survivors because he seemingly felt that the other points of con-
tact did not create such "predominant interest of the persons involved."'"
IV. FUTURE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINES
In this consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the judge was
reluctant to venture so far as to accept such an important innovation in
tort litigation. Yet, from an analysis of the trends and cases in New York
48 Id. at 109.
49Reynolds v. North Dakota Childrens Home Society, 85 N.W.2d 553 (1957); McElreath v.
McElreath, 162 Tex. 190, 345 S.W.2d 722 (1961).
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on the subject, the procedure of applying both the offensive use of collateral
estoppel and the most significant relationship test in choice of laws in tort
actions is an open avenue for the courts of that state to pursue in deter-
mining multi-passenger accident litigation.
Since New York has established itself as a leader in modern procedural
theory and practice, the state should be benefited by faster disposition of
cases subject to its determination than would have been possible in the
past. Nevertheless, New York may find itself in the position of facing
problems that were not considered in the shift to the modern procedural
devices. When any new doctrine is accepted, imaginative attorneys will
once again attempt to find and utilize the weak points which potentially
exist in each theory or practice. Inasmuch as the conjunctive use of the
relatively new doctrines is only presently being tendered to the court, the
shortcomings of the concept will be determined in the future by progres-
sive attorneys similar to those who espoused the doctrines.
John D. Jackson
RECENT DECISIONS
Insurance - Constructive Fraud - Reformation
The decedent made reservations to fly from Kansas City, Missouri to
Lubbock, Texas. The reservations were made for Friday, 25 January 1963,
but the return flight was left open. Prior to departure, the decedent's hus-
band, plaintiff, decided that the decedent should have insurance to cover her
during the trip. They approached a machine dispensing insurer's policy
T-20 which provided coverage for accidents while aboard an airplane for
the duration of the round-trip or for twelve months, whichever occurs first.
Not having the proper change, they proceeded to a booth of the insurer
and purchased policy T-18, a general accident policy that covered almost
all risks during the term of the policy. The representative of the insurer
failed to mention any of the other available policies. The term of the policy
purchased was four days. The policy expired at 11:00 a.m. on Tuesday,
29 January 1963, and the decedent was fatally injured at 10:45 p.m. that
night when the airplane crashed while attempting to land at the Kansas
City airport. The insurer denied liability, but the United States District
Court held that as a matter of equity the policy should be reformed to
cover the accident. Held, reversed: The issuer of the flight insurance policy
does not have a duty to tell the assured that several policies are available
and to explain fully the provisions and limitations of the various policies;
and accordingly, there is no basis for reformation of the contract actually
issued, a general accident policy, to conform to a regular straight flight
policy which insurer also offered for sale. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.
v. Russell, 402, F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1968), cert denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3399
(U.S. April 22, 1969) (No. 1037).
Plaintiff's argument was based upon equitable or constructive fraud on
the part of the insurer in failing to fulfill a duty to tell the assured that
several policies were available and to explain fully the provisions and limi-
tations of these policies.' In overruling the district court, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applied a more traditional and
much narrower concept of the remedy of reformation.' This concept has
always been very limited, allowing a written contract to be reformed only
when there has been mutual mistake or unilateral mistake by one party
coupled with inequitable conduct on the part of the other party.' In apply-
ing the narrower interpretation to this case, the instant court reduced the
case to one basic question: Whether, under these facts, the insurer had a
duty to explain fully the provisions and limitations of the various policies
1 Stern v. National City Co., 25 F. Supp. 948 (D. Minn. 1938).
'3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 614 (1960).
'Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Strickland, 187 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1951).
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available. Moreover, to justify a decision of reformation in favor of the
insured, the evidence supporting such a determination must be clear, un-
equivocal and decisive.4
Although reformation has been allowed in cases similar in many respects
to the present case,' the evidence in this case failed to establish a duty on
the part of the insurer which would effectively relate to the doctrine of
equitable fraud. In so holding, the court reasoned "that imposing a duty
to offer such explanations under circumstances of this kind-requiring as it
does an effort by lay persons to interpret the legal meaning of the proposed
contract as well as others available-would be fraught with great danger
to the stability of contracts. '
R.N.P.
Insurance-Aviation Exclusion-Statute of Limitations
In 1960 the insured was killed while serving as a United States Air Force
navigator on a military aircraft that was disabled by gunfire from Russian
aircraft while over international waters. The crew was forced to bail out,
and the body of the insured was never found. The life insurance policy
in question contained the following exclusionary language:
Death of the Insured occurring as a result of operating, riding in or de-
scending from any kind of aircraft (1) operated for military or naval pur-
poses .. .is a risk not assumed under said Policy [Emphasis added.].'
The appellant, wife of the insured and beneficiary of the insurance policy,
sought recovery (1) under the written policy and (2) through reforma-
tion of the policy based on the fraud of the insurer's agent in representing
the policy as one providing coverage to the insured while flying. Held,
affirmed: The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment be-
cause the circumstances of death fall within the aviation exclusion pro-
vision of the insurance contract, and the claim of reformation, because of
fraud, was barred by the statute of limitations. Goforth v. Franklin Life
Insurance Company, 202 Kan. 413, 449 P.2d 477 (1969).
Appellant conceded that numerous cases have held that death by ex-
posure or drowning after the descent of a land-based aircraft is a risk
clearly intended by the parties to be excluded under aviation exclusion
clauses, but asserted that death resulted from Russian gunfire which was
an outside or intervening cause. Citing Knouse v. Equitable Life Ins. Co.'
'Yablon v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 200 Ga. 693, 38 S.E.2d 534 (1946).
'Rosen v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 162 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1958); Stevens v. Fidelity
& Cas. Co. of N.Y., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 377 P.2d 284 (1962); Lachs v. Fidelity
& Cas. Co. of N.Y., 306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E.2d 555 (1954).
6 402 F.2d at 346.
'Goforth v. Franklin Life Insurance Company, 202 Kan. 413, 414, 449 P.2d 477, 479 (1969).
'Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. King, 161 F.2d 108 (4th Cir.), aff'd,
333 U.S. 153 (1947); Green v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 144 F.2d 55 (1st Cir. 1944).
a163 Kan. 213, 181 P.2d 310 (1947).
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and McKanna v. Continental Assurance Co.,4 the court rejected the argu-
ment that death resulting from a hostile party was a war risk and not
excluded by the aviation clause in the insurance contract. The court held
that the specific wording of the aviation exclusion was a conscious effort by
the insurance company to "exclude the risk of an insured being killed as
a result of military aircraft being shot down by the aggressive act of an
unfriendly power";' for in Knouse and McKanna Kansas courts have rea-
soned that the phrases, "in any species of aircraft" and "any device for
aerial navigation," are applicable to risks of military flights although
neither policy made specific reference to military aircraft.
Moreover, the instant court held that the lower court was correct in
sustaining summary judgment for the insurer since the appellant's claim
for reformation based on fraud was clearly within the scope of Kansas'
statute of limitations.! Although interrogatories had not been answered
by the insurer on the merits of the claim, the lower court had before it
appellant's discovery deposition bearing directly on the statute of limi-
tations question.
C.C.C.
Criminal Law - Stolen Aircraft - The National
Motor Vehicle Act
Defendant rented a Cessna aircraft in Sarasota, Florida, stating that he
wanted to fly to Key West. Instead, he flew to Birmingham, Alabama, and
later to Dubuque, Iowa, where he was arrested. He admitted that his
original intention had been to leave Florida, but alleged that he intended
to return the aircraft when he got enough money to pay the rental fee.
In district court, the defendant was convicted of interstate transportation
of an aircraft "knowing the same to have been stolen."' He appealed to
the Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit. Held, affirmed: When a per-
son obtains use of an aircraft by false pretense and crosses state lines, he
violates the Dyer Act. His intention to return the aircraft is immaterial
since "stolen" requires something less than permanency and something less
than a deprival of the totality of ownership. Stewart v. United States, 395
F.2d 484 (1968).
The Dyer Act (The National Motor Vehicle Act) was passed in 1919
to prevent the interstate transportation of "stolen" automobiles and
amended in 1945 to protect aircraft.' The 8th Circuit had originally
4165 Kan. 289, 194 P.2d 515 (1948).
'449 P.2d at 484 (1969).
'Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513 (1968 Supp.). See, Collins v. Richardson, 168 Kan. 203, 212 P.2d
302 (1949) (reformation).
' 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1964). "Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce a motor ve-
hicle or aircraft, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
2 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1964). The original Act, sponsored by Representative L. C. Dyer of Missouri,
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construed "stolen" very narrowly, that is, statutory larceny as defined by
the state where the taking occurred. The Supreme Court, in Turley v.
United States,4 adopted a broader definition that included any felonious
taking of a motor vehicle with the intent to deprive the owner of the
rights and benefits of ownership. Reasoning that the distinctions of the
crime of larceny have no relevance to the Congressional intent to prevent
the interstate transportation of illegally obtained motor vehicles,' the Court
refused to give the statute the narrowest possible interpretation that would
limit it to situations which at common law would be considered larceny.
Prior to the instant case, the Eighth Circuit applied the reasoning of
the Turley decision to Schwab v. United States.' Rejecting the defendant's
contention that permanent deprivation must be intended, the court held
that Turley establishes a broad standard that may be satisfied with less
than permanency and something less than a deprival of the totality of
ownership." Thus, the Schwab decision set the precedent in interstate trans-
portation of automobiles that was applied to aircraft in Stewart. In sum,
"stolen" within the meaning of the Dyer Act is the taking of a vehicle,
"for one's use without right."8 Any wrongful taking, whether or not it
constitutes common law larceny, is sufficient to satisfy this standard, i.e.,
if the rental of an aircraft is accompanied by cheating, interstate transpor-
tation of that aircraft is a violation of the Dyer Act.
G.R.B.
Negligence-Federal Tort Claims Act-
Government Liability
Plaintiffs' decedents were passengers in a Cessna aircraft en route to
San Antonio from Texarkana. During the flight, the Radar Approach Con-
trol Facilities (RAPCON) at Waco relayed inexact, incomplete, and mis-
leading weather information to the pilot. Lacking information that
weather conditions were so severe that he should land immediately, the
pilot, at his discretion, proceeded into the storm and crashed while at-
tempting a landing at Easterwood Airport. Alleging various acts of negli-
became law in 1919. 41 Stat. 324. It was amended, in 1945, to include aircraft, 59 Star. 536, and
was re-enacted in 1948, as part of the Criminal Code, 62 Stat. 806.
'Abraham v. United States, 15 F.2d 911, 912 (8th Cir. 1926), and Carpenter v. United States,
113 F.2d 692, 696 (8th Cir. 1940). Later, the Eighth Circuit joined the Fifth and Tenth Circuits
in the view that "stolen" should be restricted to common law larceny. Murphy v. United States,
206 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1953); Hite v. United States, 168 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1948); Stewart
v. United States, 151 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 1945). The Second, Fourth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits
favored the view that "stolen" meant "felonious taking." Boone v. United States, 235 F.2d 939
(4th Cir. 1956); Smith v. United States, 233 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1956); Breece v. United States,
218 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1954); United States v. Sicurella, 187 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1951). See also,
56 ALR.2d 1300 (1957).
' United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407 (1957).
5 Id. at 417.
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gence in weather reporting by government personnel, the plaintiff brought
suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act.1 Held: When government per-
sonnel are negligent in weather reporting and such negligence is respon-
sible for placing a pilot and his passengers in a perilous position which is
the proximate cause of their deaths, the government is liable under the
FTCA.' Gill v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 253 (E.D. Tex. 1968).
Although several acts of negligence were alleged,' the court narrowed
it down to the variance between the report received from the Austin
RAPCON by the Waco RAPCON and that relayed by the Waco
RAPCON to the pilot, and the apparent approval by the Waco RAPCON
of the route of continued flight suggested by the pilot. Finding that the
incomplete and inaccurate weather reports were responsible for placing
the pilot in the perilous position of having to attempt a landing of a light
plane at night during a severe storm, the court concluded that the crash
was the natural and probable result to be expected from an attempted
landing of a light plane in the conditions prevailing at Easterwood during
the time of the accident.
In holding the government liable under the FTCA, the court relied pri-
marily on Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines' which held that the failure to
report weather conditions promptly and accurately constitutes negligence
on the part of government personnel. Ingham is distinguishable from
the instant case in that Ingham involved a regulation specifically con-
trolling the personnel. However, it is now well established that when the
government undertakes to perform services, which in the absence of specific
legislation would not be required, it will, nevertheless, be liable if these
activities are performed negligently
L.L.C.
Warsaw Convention - Air Carrier Substitution -
Successive Carriers
Plaintiff purchased, from a New York agent of Air France, a round-
trip ticket for a trip from New York to Belgrade. The major legs of the
trip were flights (1) from New York to Paris on a specific flight on 31
'Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et. seq. (1946).
Damages are to be assessed under the wrongful death act of the state where the cause of
action arose, i.e., Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4677 (1952).
a Alleged acts of negligence were the omission of the San Antonio SIGMET No. 2 from the report
given by the operator at the Gregg County Airport in Longview and delay of personnel at Easter-
wood Airport in responding to calls from the plane.
4 373 F.2d 227, 236 (2d Cir. 1967).
' Supporting this ruling is United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954). See also, United States
v. Union Trust Company, 350 U.S. 907 (1955), where the Supreme Court relied on Indian Tow-
ing v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), in affirming the lower court's judgment that a suit could
be maintained under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the negligence of the control tower per-
sonnel in regulating the flow of traffc at the airport. In Indian Towing the Supreme Court re-
versed the Fifth Circuit by holding the government liable under the FTCA when it failed in its
duty to keep the lighthouse functioning properly.
1969]
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August, (2) from Paris to Belgrade on a specific flight on 1 September,
(3) from Belgrade back to Paris on an unspecified flight and (4) from
Paris to New York also on an unspecified flight. This contract was thus
incomplete to the extent that the return flights were not yet agreed upon.
On the ticket there appeared the initials "AF" indicating the air carrier
to be Air France for all legs of the trip. When plaintiff wished to return
from Belgrade on Thursday, 14 September 1967, there were no Air France
flights scheduled to Paris. In order to permit the plaintiff to start her return
flight on Thursday, Air France in Belgrade changed her ticket to substitute
Yugoslav Airways as the carrier from Belgrade to Paris, by attaching a
"revalidated form" to her original ticket.1 Plaintiff suffered injuries while
disembarking at Munich, an intermediate stop on the way to Paris, and
sued Air France for those injuries. Both parties to the suit stipulated that
the Warsaw Convention was applicable to the flight. Whether Air France
was liable to the plaintiff depended upon whether Yugoslav Airways was
a "successive carrier" within the meaning of Article 30 of the Convention.!
If Yugoslav Airways was a successive carrier, the plaintiff could sue only
Yugoslav, otherwise Air France could be liable in the action. Held: Since
the completion and amendment at Belgrade was within the contemplation
of the parties when the incomplete contract was made in New York, it is
fair and reasonable to treat the completion and amendment as relating
back to the time of the making of the contract in New York making
Yugoslav Airways a successive carrier under the Warsaw Convention.
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability is there-
fore denied, and the court grants summary judgment to Air France with-
out a motion. Briscoe v. Campagnie National Air France, 290 F. Supp.
863 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
The plaintiff argued that the contract of transportation made at New
York did not provide for transportation to be performed by various suc-
cessive carriers, and therefore, Article 30 was inapplicable. The court felt
that this argument ignored what had happened in Belgrade, that is, the
passenger and Air France agreed to complete and amend the original New
York made contract by designating Yugoslav Airways for one leg of the
return trip, Belgrade to Paris.
The court asserted by analogy that since in other hypothetical situations
in which Yugoslav Airways could have become the carrier for the Belgrade-
Paris leg it would have been a successive carrier, there should not be a
different result in this case:
'Yugoslav Airways, flight number 249, 14 Sept. 1967.
'Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air, 29 Oct. 1934, art. 30, 49 Stat. 3014 T.S. No. 876.
(1) In the case of transportation to be performed by various successive carriers and falling
within the definition set out in the third paragraph of article 1, each carrier who accepts passen-
gers, baggage or goods shall be subject to the rules set out in this convention, and shall be deemed
to be one of the contracting parties to the contract of transportation insofar as the contract deals
with that part of the transportation which is performed under his supervision.
(2) In the case of transportation of this nature, the passenger or his representative can take
action only against the carrier who performed the transportation during which the accident or the
delay occurred, save in the case where, by express agreement, the first carrier has assumed liability
for the whole journey.
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If she [the plaintiff] had known in New York that she wished to leave Bel-
grade, as she did, on September 14, 1967, then the ticket at New York
would there have been written to provide that transportation from Belgrade
to Paris was "to be performed" by Yugoslav Airways. In that event, clearly
plaintiff could proceed only against Yugoslav Airways as a "successive car-
rier." If plaintiff had not arranged at New York for transportation from
Belgrade but had gone to Air France in Belgrade and had made an original
contract there for the same transportation as was in fact provided under her
New York ticket, then transportation from Belgrade to Paris under such
contract would have been provided "to be performed" by Yugoslav Airways.
In that event also, clearly plaintiff could proceed only against Yugoslav Air-
ways as a "successive carrier." It would be strange and illogical to reach a
different result merely because of the circumstance that the contract in-
complete in New York was completed and amended in Belgrade [Emphasis
added.].'
But the plaintiff did not tell Air France she wanted to leave Belgrade on
14 September when she made her contract in New York, nor did she buy
a one way ticket to Belgrade and then try to buy a ticket from Belgrade
back to Paris with Yugoslav Airways designated as the carrier. Plaintiff
purchased a round-trip ticket without having the return flights designated
beforehand. Different facts do provide for different results, and the argu-
ment by analogy did not bolster the court's decision.
The court cited cases mentioned in Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law
for the proposition that if the original contract had a clause permitting
the airline or the passenger to substitute another carrier, there would be
successive carriers. Shawcross and Beaumont are themselves critical of
these cases:
[I]t is difficult to see how substitution of a carrier made after the carriage
has commenced can amount to successive carriers, because, instead of being
carriage which at the time of the contract was to be performed by successive
carriers, it would instead be carriage which might be performed by successive
carriers.4
The court differentiates the treatise's reasoning by saying Shawcross and
Beaumont were talking of unilateral substitution by the carrier or by the
passenger, under a contract provision giving such rights of substitution,
and not where the two parties mutually agreed to change carriers and the
original contract was incomplete. It is submitted that this reasoning at-
tempted to use the treatise for what it did not say.
The court was in a difficult situation because no authority on the ques-
tion had been cited or could be found. Nevertheless, the court had an
excellent opportunit yto make a clearly reasoned analysis unhampered by
precedent. Its opinion, however, was not clear.
J.H.G.
3 Briscoe v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 290 F. Supp. 863, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).4 1d. at 866-67.
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